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COMMENTS
CRBIINAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE DRUG DEPENDENCE
DEFENSE-A NEED FOR JUDICIAL CLARIFICATION
Western man pays frequent homage to the freedom of his will ...
But man does not will everything that happens to him, and the precepts
of free will and accountability have been tempered in relation to many con-
ditions of existence. Foremost of these, of course, is the notion of sickness.
Although the individual may place himself in a position which increases the
risk of disease, he does not usually will to be sick; accordingly, he is gen-
erally not held accountable either for his sickness or for its behavioral con-
comitants.'
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1925, in Linder v. United States,2 the Supreme Court recognized that
narcotics addiction is a disease. Although almost fifty years have passed since
this pronouncement, narcotics addicts continue to face criminal sanctions, if
not for the status of their addiction per se, 3 at least for its "behavioral con-
comitants." Recently, however, a widespread debate has unfolded among com-
mentators4 and in the courts5 concerning the limits of the state's power to
1. Second Report of the National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse, Drug
Use in America: Problem in Perspective 113 (Mard 1973) [hereinafter cited as Second
Report].
2. 268 U.S. 5, 18 (1925).
3. In Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), the Court held that the pure status
of being addicted to narcotics was not criminally punishable. See text accompanying notes
41-44 infra.
4. Burnett, Crisis in Narcotics-Are Existing Federal Penalties Effective?, 10 Wm. &
Mary L. Rev. 636 (1969); Cantor, The Criminal Law and the Narcotics Problem, 51
J. Crim. L.C. & P.S. 512 (1961); Frankel, Narcotic Addiction, Criminal Responsibility, and
Civil Commitment, 1966 Utah L. Rev. 581 [hereinafter cited as Frankel]; Neibel, Implica-
tions of Robinson v. California, 1 Houston L. Rev. 1 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Neibel];
Comment, Emerging Recognition of Pharmacological Duress as a Defense to Possession of
Narcotics: Watson v. United States, 59 Geo. L.J. 761 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Emerg-
ing Recognition]; Comment, Addiction, Insanity, and Due Process of Law: An Examina-
tion of the Capacity Defense, 3 Harv. Civ. Rights-Civ. Lib. L. Rev. 125 (1967) [herein-
after cited as Capacity Defense]; Note, The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and
the Substantive Criminal Law, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 635 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Cruel &
Unusual Punishment]; Note, Criminal Law: Watson-The First Step Towards More
Humane Treatment of Narcotic Addicts in the Courts of the District of Columbia, 17
How. L.. 188 (1971) [hereinafter cited as First Step]; Note, The Doctrine of Phar-
macological Duress: A Critical Analysis, 3 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Social Change 141 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Law and Social Change]; Note, Revival of the Eighth Amendment:
Development of Cruel-Punishment Doctrine by the Supreme Court, 16 Stan. L. Rev. 996
(1964) [hereinafter cited as Revival-Eighth Amendment]; Note, Punishment of a Narcotic
Addict for Crime of Possession: Eighth Amendment Implications, 2 Val. U.L. Rev. 316
(1968) [hereinafter cited as Punishment]; see also Greenawalt, "Uncontrollable" Actions
and the Eighth Amendment: Implications of Powell v. Texas, 69 Colum. L. Rev. 927 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Greenawalt].
5. Smith v. Follette, 445 F.2d 955 (2d Cir. 1971); Watson v. United States, 439 F.2d
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impose such sanctions upon the "non-trafficking"0 drug addict for "consumption-
related" offenses. 7 Those who oppose imposition of such penalties urge the
442 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Bailey v. United States, 386 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
392 U.S. 946 (1968); United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966); Hutcher-
son v. United States, 34t F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 894 (1965) ; Castle v.
United States, 347 F.2d 492 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 929 (1965); Lloyd
v. United States, 343 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 952 (1965); United
States v. Sutton, 346 F. Supp. 464 (D.D.C. 1972); United States v. Lindsey, 324 F.
Supp. 55 (D.D.C. 1971); United States v. Ashton, 317 F. Supp. 860 (D.D.C. 1970);
Wheeler v. United States, 276 A.2d 722 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971); People v. Zapata, 220 Cal.
App. 2d 903, 34 Cal. Rptr. 171 (3d Dist. 1963), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 377 U.S.
406 (1964). See also Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (chronic alcoholism) ; cases cited
in note 47 infra.
6. The term "non-trafficking" was used repeatedly by the court of appeals In Watson
v. United States, 439 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Although the court did not define the
term, its meaning can be implied from the court's statement that a defendant urging the
drug dependence defense must bear the burden of placing himself in the category of an
addict who is in possession of narcotics solely for his own use. Id. at 454; see notes 74,
113 infra and accompanying text. Presumably, this is the converse of trafficking. In a
district court case following Watson, the court asked for a standard to be developed "to
separate the non-trafficking addict from those addicts who may be punished." United
States v. Ashton, 317 F. Supp. 860, 862 (D.D.C. 1970).
7. The phrase is used extensively in the Second Report, supra note 1. Consumption-
related offenses include use of narcotics and possession and purchase for one's personal
use. One commentator suggests that there are actually three different classes of narcotics
crimes: 1) being addicted, which has been held non-punishable by the Robinson decision,
2) acts committed by an addict which are non-narcotics crimes, and 3) narcotics crimes
committed by the addict which are necessary to the maintenance of his addiction and
involve obtaining, using and possessing narcotics or, in states where the laws are applicable,
narcotics "paraphernalia." In this classification, "narcotics crimes" such as "sale" which
are not a necessary condition of the habit fall in group 2. The drug dependence defense
is, for the most part, urged only for class 3 or "consumption-related" offenses. Neibel,
supra note 4, at 4-5. Neibel indicates that most narcotics prosecutions are for possessing
a narcotic drug. Id. at 6.
That the modern trend is toward the reduction of possession penalties is exemplified by
the fact that while the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act, § 2, 9B U.LXA. (Supp. 1967), historically
outlawed "possession" leaving the penalty to be imposed to the discretion of the states,
id. § 20, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law has now ex-
pressly recommended that state legislatures reduce the possession offense to a misdemeanor.
Second Report 245. Thirty-six states have now adopted this Act with some modification.
Perito, Pinco & Duerk, Treatment Alternatives to Non-incarceration for Drug-Abusing
Defendants, 2 U. Balt. L. Rev. 187, 193-94 n.33 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Perito, Pinco
& Duerk]. The act differentiates between the trafficker and the possessor for private use.
Id. at 193. But see N.Y. Penal Law §§ 220.06, 220.09, 220.12, 220.16, 220.18, 220.21 (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1973), where possession of certain quantities of narcotic drugs and narcotic
preparations is made a felony, the class of felony being dependent upon the amount
possessed.
The Second Report points out that 32 states now permit conditional discharge of first-
time possession offenders before an adjudication of guilt. The defendant is absolutely dis-
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adoption of a "drug dependence defense" which, under certain circumstances,
would constitute a complete defense for consumption-related offenses.8 The
charged if he meets the conditions of his probation. New York and North Carolina allow this
only as to possession of marihuana. Id. at 246 n.16.
On the federal level, the Boggs Act of 1951, ch. 666, 65 Stat. 767, imposed a two-year
minimum for crimes presumed by a showing of possession. The Narcotic Control Act of
1956, ch. 629, §§ 103, 108, 70 Stat. 567 raised the minimum to five years and did away
with the possibility of probation. By contrast, the Controlled Substances Act, Pub. L. No.
91-513, tit. II, 84 Stat. 1242 (1970) (codified in scattered sections of 18, 21, 28 U.S.C.),
occupies the field of federal drug legislation and reduces the federal possession offense for
narcotics (defined in 21 U.S.C. § 802(16) (1970)) from a felony to a misdemeanor for first-
time offenders. 21 U.S.C. § 844 (1970). Like the state Uniform Controlled Substances Act
which is modelled after it, the federal Controlled Substances Act thus distinguishes be-
tween traffickers and non-trafficking possessors. It is the first federal act so to do. Perito,
Pinco & Duerk 190, 193.
In addition, the Controlled Substances Act repealed Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7237(d),
which was added by the Narcotic Control Act of 1956 and which precluded suspended
sentences or probation for most convictions under the Harrison and Jones-Miller Acts.
See notes 77 & 78 infra. Section 404 of the 1970 Act, now codified in 21 U.S.C. § 844 (1970),
provides in the case of possession offenses, that the offender may be placed on probation
for not more than one year. If the conditions of the probation are met, the proceedings
may be dismissed without a court adjudication of guilt.
It is important to note that possession is still a felony under § 844 for the repeat
offender, 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (1970). The statute does not refer to use, being under the
influence or the act of obtaining narcotics. For a review of current state and federal laws
dealing with drug addiction see Perito, Pinco & Duerk 189-95.
The courts have responded in different ways to this flood of legislation. Several courts
have flatly rejected possession for personal use as a defense. See, eg., United States v.
Piccarelli, 230 F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1956); People v. Myers, 52 Ill. 2d 2S8, 287 N.E.2d 672
(1972). Other courts, confronted with consumption-related "acts" of addiction, have found
grounds on which to distinguish these "acts" from the pure status of addiction which was
held non-punishable in Robinson. See, e.g., United States ex rel Swanson v. Reincke, 344
F.2d 260 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 869 (1965) (self-administration); Bruno v.
Louisiana, 316 F. Supp. 1120 (E.D. La. 1970) (habitual use); State v. Ma-go, 40 NJ. 188,
191 A.2d 43 (1963) (being under the influence); Salas v. State, 365 S.W.2d 174 (Te. Ct.
Crim. App.), appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 15 (1963) (being under the influence); Browne v.
State, 24 Wis. 2d 491, 129 N.W.2d 175 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 1004 (1965) (use).
8. The content of the drug dependence defense is set forth in the text accompanying
notes 74 & 113 infra. Basically, it would afford the non-trafficking drug addict a complete
defense for possession, purchase and use crimes if "at the time of the offense, the defendant,
as a result of his repeated use of narcotics, lacked substantial capacity to conform his conduct
to the requirements of the law." United States v. Moore, No. 71-1252 at 249 (D.C. Cir.,
May 14, 1973) (en banc) [hereinafter cited as Moore Slip Opinion], cert. denied, 94 S. Ct.
298 (1973).
The contents and contours of the defense have emerged gradually in judicial opinions
and in scholarly dissertations. Moore Slip Opinion; Smith v. Follette, 445 F2d 9SS (2d Cir.
1971); Watson v. United States, 439 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (en banc); Salzman v.
United States, 405 F.2d 358, 364 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (dissenting opinion); United States v.
Freeman, 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966); Hutcherson v. United States, 345 F.2d 964 (D.C.
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concept of a drug dependence defense evokes comment on the content and
constitutionality of current federal and state laws dealing with drug addiction,
and takes on added significance when viewed as one facet of the larger debate
which has emerged concerning the role of the courts in establishing uniform
principles of responsibility in American criminal law.9
II. THE OBJEcTvWs OF CRIMINAL LAW
There always have been essentially two somewhat antithetical postulates
which have formed the underlying bases of criminal responsibility: the objec-
tive basis, emphasizing the external conduct of the actor, and the subjective
basis, emphasizing the actor's ability to control and direct that conduct. 10
When society was in its formative stages the purpose of punishment was
revenge, and objective liability-commitment of the injurious act-was all that
was required." It was not until the rise of the Christian Church that the
requirement of a guilty mind entered the law,12 giving rise to the retributive
theory of punishment which called for the imposition of penalties in response
to acts considered "morally blameworthy."la
Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 894 (1965); Castle v. United States, 347 F.2d 492 (D.C. Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 929 (1965); United States v. Lindsey, 324 F. Supp. 55 (D.D.C.
1971); United States v. Ashton, 317 F. Supp. 860 (D.D.C. 1970); Neibel 7; Capacity
Defense, supra note 4; Emerging Recognition, supra note 4, at 770; Law & Social Change,
supra note 4; Punishment, supra note 4, at 336-37. The trend toward the reduction of
penalties for consumption-related offenses, see note 7 supra, and the emergence of the
drug dependence defense have been coupled with an emphasis on dispositional alterna-
tives for handling narcotics cases. E.g., Moore Slip Opinion (remanded for further reconsidera-
tion of disposition under Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act of 1966 [hereinafter cited as
N.A.R.A.]; Kleinbart v. United States, 439 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (remanded for dis-
position under NA.R.A.); Watson v. United States, 439 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (two-
prior-felony disqualifying provision of N.A.R.A. unconstitutional). N.A.R.A., 28 U.S.C. §§
2901-06 (1970), provides for voluntary pre-trial commitment of narcotics addicts charged
with federal crimes. Commitment is for 36 months, 28 U.S.C. § 2902(a) (1970). If treatment
is successfully completed, criminal charges are dismissed; if not, prosecution is resumed. Id.
NA.R.A., 18 U.S.C. §§ 4251-55 (1970), provides for involuntary commitment of those
addicts actually convicted of a federal offense. Commitment is for an indefinite period not
to exceed ten years or the maximum sentence that could otherwise have been imposed. Id.
at § 4253(a). For a current examination of other proposed dispositional alternatives see
Perito, Pinco & Duerk, supra note 7, at 200-10 & app. II at 218-19.
9. Bayles, Dismantling the Criminal Law System, 19 Wayne L. Rev. 827 (1973) [here-
inafter cited as Bayles]; Binavince, The Ethical Foundation of Criminal Liability, 33
Fordham L. Rev. 1 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Binavince]; Dubin, Mens Rea Reconsidered:
A Plea for a Due Process Concept of Criminal Responsibility, 18 Stan. L. Rev. 322 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Dubin]; Greenawalt, supra note 4; Hart, The Aims of the Criminal
Law, 23 Law & Contemp. Prob. 401 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Hart]; Packer, Mens Rea
& the Supreme Court, 1962 Sup. Ct. Rev. 107 [hereinafter cited as Packer].
10. Binavince 34.
11. Id. at 4.
12. Id. at 14-15.
13. Dubin 337-38; Greenawalt 938. Binavince points out that moral responsibility de-
[Vol. 42
DRUG DEPENDENCE DEFENSE
As society became more complex and the social order seemed threatened, 14
a "general deterrence" theory of punishment was espoused which allowed the
imposition of criminal sanctions whenever it was socially efficadous.i ' If the
purpose of punishment was not met in a particular situation, the conduct was
excused. This approach led to the development of a criminal justice system
.based on the gradual emergence of "excusing conditions" rather than on the
positive articulation of unifying principles of criminal law.'0 Moreover, with
the ascendance of the general deterrence theory of punishment, fewer excusing
conditions have been allowed since, even where the actor is not morally blame-
worthy, punishment has been justified for its deterrent effecL17
Ill. JUDICIAL EVOLUTION OF PRINCIPLES
oF CR IINAL RPESPONSIBILITY
Incidents of the Supreme Court's interference with the power of state legis-
latures to define crimes have been rare. When they have occurred, they have
been based alternatively on three major standards: 1) the concept of "fairness"
inherent in constitutional due process;' 8 2) the notion of "voluntariness" em-
bodied in the common law requirement of incus rea; 1 3) and, most recently,
veloped with the concept of sin and that sanctions followed sin. Binavince 15. For the
origins of the concept of sanction see R. Pound, Criminal Justice in America 26 (1930).
Pound notes that "the law begins by using penalties. Later it learns more effective and
discriminating means of enforcing its precepts." Id. at 27. See generally J. Hall, General
Principles of Criminal Law 71-72 (2d ed. 1960).
14. Binavince 27.
15. Dubin 341. Such socially efficacious consequences included deterrence, both of the
actor and of other actors similarly situated, isolation and reformation of dangerous
persons, revenge, and reinforcement of community norms. Greenawalt 938. The dissent in
Moore concludes that of the four primary goals of penology, which it states are retribu-
tion, deterrence, isolation and rehabilitation, only isolation and rehabilitation serve any
useful purpose with respect to drug addiction, and they are better achieved by allowing
a drug dependence defense and civil commitment of the addict. Moore Slip Opinion
215-24. Most commentators give similar listings, but include a fifth goal variously phrased
as "community condemnation" or "reinforcement of general community norms." Greenawalt
938; Hart, supra note 9, at 401; Revival-Eighth Amendment, supra note 4, at 1011.
16. Dubin 325, 346.
17. Id. at 341. Possession penalties might, for example, have absolutely no deterrent
effect on the addict, but may deter the experimenter.
18. Due process has been used, for example, to condemn vague, unpublished and ex
post facto laws. Capacity Defense, supra note 4, at 161, citing Lanzetta v. New Jersey,
306 U.S. 451 (1939) (vagueness-defendants' convictions as "gangsters" reversed); see
Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957) (where defendant lacked actual notice of the
law); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167 (1925) (where the Court implied in dictum that
ex post facto laws may be violative of substantive due process). Capacity Defense 161
nn.126-28. It is important to note that the decision in Lambert really represented the
constitutionalization of mens rea through the due process clause. Packer, supra note 9, at
127-37.
19. See, e.g., Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
1973]
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the prohibition found in the eighth amendment against cruel and unusual pun-
ishment.20
A. Due Process
Historically, the Court has emphasized rigorous review of the criminal law
for the procedural guarantees of due process, while minimizing its application
of the clause's substantive requirements. 21 Significantly, the Court avoided the.
use of due process as a unifying standard of criminal responsibility dealing with
a lack of capacity defense in Leland v. Oregon.22 Judicial rejection of the sub-
stantive requirements of due process has been criticized on the ground that the
existence of procedural safeguards makes very little sense "if anything what-
ever can be made a crime in the first place." 23 Advocates of the due process
clause as the constitutional basis for criminal law standards point to the sim-
ilarities between traditional due process issues and the lack of capacity de-
fense.24 They suggest that ignorance of law or fact, the concept of "fair notice,"
and the whole "void for vagueness" doctrine traditionally dealt with in the due
process context, essentially involve the inability to conform one's conduct to
the requirements of the law.25 Strongly protesting this position, however, are
those who consider that the contours of substantive due process are too vague
to be used in establishing standards of criminal responsibility.20
20. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
21. Dubin 369; Greenawalt 972; Packer 127 n.70; Capacity Defense 125, citing In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), as examples of
the emphasis on procedural due process in the criminal area. Capacity Defense 125 n.2.
The Court's substantive use of due process has been limited to free speech cases and
certain "void for vagueness" statutes. In the free speech cases in particular, the doctrine
of mens rea was applied through the due process clause to accomplish the result. Packer
122, 125. But see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
22. 343 U.S. 790 (1952). The traditional lack of capacity defenses are insanity, self
defense and duress. Capacity Defense 127. For the proposition that narcotics addiction
should be positioned with the traditional lack of capacity defenses see text accompanying
notes 65-66 infra.
23. Hart 431; accord, Packer 127. Packer agrees with Hart that there are "unmis-
takable indications that the Constitution means something definite and something serious
when it speaks of 'crime.'" Id. quoting Hart 431. Packer suggests that "it would be anomalous
if that 'something' turned out to concern only procedures by which criminal sanctions are
brought to bear and not what conduct they are brought to bear upon," Packer 127.
24. Dubin 384; Hart 431; Packer 123; Capacity Defense 158-65.
25. Packer 123; Capacity Defense 161-62. The latter source points out that just as the
"average" citizen cannot conform to unpublished, vague, or ex post facto laws, a sick
person, like the drug addict, cannot conform to laws which make criminal those acts which
are symptomatic of his disease. Id. That the standard of fairness inherent in due process
requires that all laws be "obeyable", id. at 162, essentially involves what Professor Dubin
terms the "conformity principle" under which "[aln individual is not criminally responsible
ffor his acts] if he could not have conformed his conduct to the requirements of the law
he is alleged to have violated." Dubin 365. Dubin believes that the "capacity doctrine has
been almost completely ignored by the Supreme Court." Id. at 384 (footnote omitted).
26. The argument here is that vague standards permit judges to legislate their own
concepts of "ordered liberty" inherent in due process into the law. Capacity Defense 163.
[Vol. 42
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B. Mens Rea
Although the exact meaning of mens rea as a standard of criminal responsi-
bility has never been easy to graspar modem commentators agree that it has
come to be a convenient shorthand to describe the mental element of the law
required for establishing criminal guilt.28 In the early twentieth century, how-
ever, this requirement was challenged seriously by the introduction into the
law of certain "public offenses" which could be defined without reference to
underlying principles of criminal responsibility. 20 Indeed, in 1922 the Supreme
Court actually held that the mere omission of any mention of criminal intent
from a criminal enactment defining public welfare offenses dispensed with such
intent as an element of the crime?0 It was not until 1952, when an attempt
was made to extend the "public welfare" line of cases and to carry this pre-
sumption over into a federal statute defining a "common law" crime, that an
alarmed Court in Morissette v. United States3l catapulted the concept of mens
rea back into the forefront of the criminal law 2 Unfortunately, the Court's
fuzzy definition of the class of crimes in which a presumption of intent would
still be allowed38 diminished the impact of its emphasis on mens rea as a uni-
form standard of criminal responsibility.
27. J. Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law 73 (2d ed. 1960). "' fMens rea, chameleon-
like, takes on different colors in different surroundings." Id. at 75 (italics omitted), quoting
from Sayre, The Present Significance of Mens Rea in the Criminal Law, in Harvard Legal
Essays 402 (1934). Mens rea has been called "the most significant exculpatory concept in
criminal law theory." Dubin 351.
28. R. Perkins, Criminal Law 740 (2d ed. 1969). According to Perkins, both a mental
(mens rea) and a physical (actus reus) element are required in every crime, id. at 740-42,
and those elements must be causally related, id. at 834. As some American statutes phrase it,
there must be a "'union of act and intent." Packer 108 & n.S, wherein the author cites
California Penal Code § 20 (West Supp. 1970).
29. Binavince, supra note 9, at 28. For a general discussion of the development of
strict liability and public welfare offenses see id. at 27-34. State statutes regulating a wide
range of "public offenses" from traffic and zoning violations to bigamy and statutory rape
were enacted and acquiesced in by the courts. Such offenses included the sale of narcotics,
adultery, and possession or transportation of gambling devices. Id. at 31.
30. United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922) (sale of narcotics) ; see Packer 110-27.
31. 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
32. Finding that the "ancient requirement of a culpable state of mind" was basic to our
philosophy of criminal law, id. at 250, Justice Jackson cautioned that the "[clonsequences
of a general abolition of intent as an ingredient of serious crimes" were so grave that the
Court should not assume that Congress desired such abolition without clear evidence of
that desire. Id. at 254 n.14.
33. It was not clear from Morissette which allowed Balint to stand whether it was
permissible for all "new" public welfare crimes, as opposed to common law crimes, to
impose any penalty whatsoever without reference to criminal intent, or whether this would
hold true only if the penalty were a light one. Part of this difficulty stems from the fact
that the statute in question in the Balint case provided for a substantial penalty of not
more than five years imprisonment or a $2,000 fine or both. Act of Dec. 17, 1914, ch. I, § 9,
38 Stat. 785.
19731
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C. Eighth Amendment
Although originally directed against such clearly cruel and unusual methods
of punishment as burning, branding and disemboweling,8 4 the eighth amend-
ment has been used in modem times to prohibit more sophisticated methods
of punishment, such as the deprivation of one's citizenship.35 Excessive pun-
ishment also has been held to violate the eighth amendment although the
method used was not in itself cruel or unusual. Thus, in Weems v. United
States86 the Court employed the eighth amendment to overturn a sentence of
fifteen years at hard labor for the crime of falsifying a public document.87
The concepts of inherent cruelty in the method of punishment and of ex-
cessive punishment came together recently in Furman v. Georgia,88 where the
Court held that the death penalty, as currently administered constituted cruel
and unusual punishment.3 9 Although the Court's decision left some issues un-
resolved,40 Furman indicates that the eighth amendment has come to embody
broad considerations of human decency.
34. Punishment, supra note 4, at 325. For a period during the 19th century the eighth
amendment was considered obsolete by some jurists who understood its limited purpose
to be only the elimination of punishments which had long since passed out of common
usage. Cruel & Unusual Punishment, supra note 4, at 637; see also Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238, 240-57 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).
35. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958). In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S.
144 (1963), Justice Brennan found in his concurring opinion that Trop was controlling
on the question of the constitutionality of certain provisions of the immigration acts which
called for automatic forfeiture of citizenship for departing from or remaining outside the
country in order to avoid the draft in time of crisis. Id. at 190-93.
36. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
37. Id. at 382.
38. 408 U.S. 328 (1972), noted in 41 Fordham L. Rev. 671 (1973).
39. Id. at 239-40 (per curiam). In point of fact, it is difficult to state what the Court
did hold in Furman except that in the particular cases presented to it, the imposition of
the death penalty was cruel and unusual and, hence, a violation of the eighth amendment.
The difficulty in generalizing the Furman decision lies in the wide split among the Justices
as to the precise grounds for the decision. Justices Brennan and Marshall stated that capital
punishment would be cruel and unusual no matter how it was administered. Id. at 257-306
(Brennan, J., concurring) ; id. at 314-74 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justices Stewart, White,
and Douglas said that it was cruel and unusual only because of the way in which it was
administered. Id. at 306-10 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 310-14 (WhIte, J., con-
curring); id. at 240-57 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justices Burger, Blacknun, Powell,
and Rehnquist dissented, id. at 375-405 (Burger, J., dissenting); id. at 405-14 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting); id. at 414-65 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 465-70 (Rehnqulst, J., dis-
senting). See 41 Fordham L. Rev. 671 (1973) for a discussion of the split within the
Court.
40. The principal unresolved issue was whether the Court would uphold a "mandatory
death penalty for a strictly limited class of crimes." 41 Fordham L. Rev. 671, 683 (1973).
In addition, and perhaps more importantly in terms of the historical evolution of the
eighth amendment, the language of the separate opinions left open the question of whether
the death penalty as currently administered violates the eighth amendment because It Is
inherently cruel, or excessive, or both. justice Brennan emphasized inherent cruelty (408
U.S. at 287), excessiveness and arbitrariness (id. at 305). Justice Marshall emphasized
[Vol. 42
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The final, and perhaps most unusual application of the eighth amendment
in terms of its development, came in 1962 in Robinson v. California.4' Robin-
son dealt with a California statute which made it a misdemeanor punishable
by imprisonment for any person to "be addicted to the use of narcotics."' 2 The
Court found that the statute "makes the 'status' of narcotic addiction a crim-
inal offense"4 3 and held that "a state law which imprisons a person thus afflicted
as a criminal, even though he has never touched any narcotic drug within the
State or been guilty of any irregular behavior there, inflicts a cruel and un-
usual punishment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment."44 The unique-
ness of this holding arises from the Court's emphasis on the fact of punishment
rather than on its nature.45 Writing for the majority, Mr. Justice Stewart stated:
[I]mnprisonment for ninety days is not, in the abstract, a punishment which is either
cruel or unusual. But the question cannot be considered in the abstract. Even one
day in prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment for the "crime" of having a
common cold.48
Most courts which have been confronted with Robinson-related problems
have interpreted the case narrowly as an application of the principle that the
law may not punish a mere condition or status, and that only acts may be made
the subject of criminal legislation. 47 However, the decision itself seems to have
excessiveness. Id. at 331. Justice Stewart emphasized inherent cruelty in the light of the
arbitrary manner of infliction of the penalty. Id. at 309-10. In addition, Justice Brennan
pointed out that the cruel and unusual punishment clause protects nothing less than the
"dignity of man." Id. at 270.
41. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
42. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11721 (West 1957), amended Cal. Stats. 1963, ch. 913,
repealed Cal. Stats. 1972, ch. 1407: "No person shall use, or be under the influence of, or be
addicted to the use of narcotics, excepting when administered by or under the direction of
a person licensed by the State to prescribe and administer narcotics."
43. 370 U.S. at 666.
44. Id. at 667.
45. Punishment, supra note 4, at 325.
46. 370 U.S. at 667.
47. See cases collected in Cruel & Unusual Punishment, supra note 4, at 646-47. By far
the majority of courts which have interpreted Robinson have relied on the status/act
distinction. This no doubt stems from the passage in the Court's opinion which states:
"This statute, therefore, is not one which punishes a person for the use of narcotics, for
their purchase, sale or possession, or for antisocial or disorderly behavior resulting from
their administration .... Rather, we deal with a statute which makes the 'status' of
narcotic addiction a criminal offense, for which the offender may be prosecuted 'at any
time before he reforms." 370 U.S. at 666. Clearly, the Court was influenced particularly
by the fact that a defendant could have been convicted under the California statute
without ever having committed an act within the state. Id. at 667. All of the following
cases have discussed the implications of the status/act distinction set forth in Robinson.
Those implications extend beyond the pure status/act distinction to the more subtle
question of whether an act, though performed, can properly be the subject of criminal
sanctions if it is in some sense involuntary or compelled. The implications also extend
beyond cases involving narcotics addiction to other compelled criminal "acts": Powell v.
Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 532-33 (1968); Sanchez v. Nelson, 446 F.2d 849, 850 (9th Cir. 1971)
(per curiam) (possession of narcotics distinguished from status of addiction); Smith v.
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left open the question of whether the drug addict can in fact be punished for
the compulsive acts of his addiction such as purchase, possession and use of
narcotics. The conclusion that the criminal sanction may not be invoked in
response to acts which are symptomatic of a disease, which involves a broader
reading of the Robinson decision,48 presupposes a more rigid set of standards
for the imposition of criminal penalties than the hornbook status/act distinc-
tion. Not only must there be some act, but the act itself must be "voluntary."
While the requirement of a "voluntary act" may be semantically confusing, it
provides some basis for rationalizing standards of criminal responsibility wher-
ever the defendant's acts are compelled by disease.
IV. STATUS OFFENSEs-NARcoTics ADDICTION,
ALcoHoLIsm AND INSANITY
49
When read in its narrowest sense as prohibiting criminal punishment of the
"pure status" crime of narcotics addiction,"O Robinson would seem to have little
Follette, 445 F.2d 955 (2d Cir. 1971) (Robinson "was in no way intended to stand for the
proposition that those who affirmatively commit crimes because of their condition may
not be punished." Id. at 961) (dictum); Watson v. United States, 439 F.2d 442, 452-53
(D.C. Cir. 1970) (possession of narcotics); United States ex rel. Mudry v. Rundie, 429
F.2d 1316 (3d Cir. 1970) (per curiam) (use and possession distinguished from addiction in
dicta); United States ex rel. Swanson v. Reincke, 344 F.2d 260, 262-63 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 869 (1965) (self-administration of narcotics distinguished from status of
addiction); Castle v. United States, 347 F.2d 492, 493-95 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
381 U.S. 929 (1965) (possession of narcotics distinguished); People v. Zapata, 220 Cal. App.
2d 903, 34 Cal. Rptr. 171, 173-74 (3d Dist. 1963), appeal dismissed and cert. denied,
377 U.S. 406 (1964) (possession of narcotics distinguished); People v. Jones, 43 Ill. 2d
113, 117-19, 251 N.E.2d 195, 198 (1969) (homosexuality and a deviate sexual assault not
synonymous); People v. Jackson, 40 Ill. 2d 143, 144-45, 238 N.E.2d 383, 384-85 (1968)
(possession must be an "involuntary result of physical dependence" to be punishable);
People v. Nettles, 34 Ill. 2d 52, 56, 213 N.E.2d 536, 539 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
1008 (1967) (possession distinguished); People v. Luckey, 90 Ill. App. 2d 325, 331-32, 234
N.E.2d 26, 30 (1st Dist. 1967), aff'd, 42 Ill. 2d 115, 245 N.E.2d 769 (1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 942 (1970) (possession distinguished); Nutter v. State, 8 Md. App. 635, 644-45, 262
A.2d 80, 86-87 (1970) (the victims of drug addiction are criminals, not by reason of being
addicts but because responsibility for certain acts exists even though stemming from addic-
tion) (cocaine); State v. Margo, 40 NJ. 188, 191 A.2d 43, 43-44 (1963) (per curlam) (being
under the influence distinguished from use); Commonwealth v. Williams, 432 Pa. 44, 56,
246 A.2d 356, 363 (1968) (repeated anti-social acts); Salas v. State, 365 S.W.2d 174 (Tex.
Ct. Crim. App.), appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 15 (1963) (habitual use or being under the
influence distinguished); Browne v. State, 24 Wis. 2d 491, 501-02, 129 N.W.2d 175, 179
(1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 1004 (1965) (taking and using drugs without prescription
distinguished).
48. Such a reading is suggested by Justice Fortas in his dissent in Powell, 392 U.S. at
557. See also text accompanying note 61 infra and note 74 infra; Cruel & Unusual Punish-
ment, supra note 4, at 650-54.
49. While insanity is not traditionally thought of as a "status" crime, it can be con-
strued in the broader sense of "status one cannot change." Thus, insanity is positioned
with other status crimes in Cruel & Unusual Punishment 652-54.
50. The "pure status" rationale of Robinson is discussed in Cruel & Unusual Punishment
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impact on the disposition of other "status crimes." 51 Interpreted broadly, how-
ever, Robinson would not only prohibit punishment of crimes like possession of
narcotics for one's personal use, but also, for instance, where the disease of
chronic alcoholism was involved, for one's acts while drunk. It was in fact in
the area of alcoholism that Robinson was first given its broadest reading.
In 1966, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held, in Driver v. Hinnant, 2
that a North Carolina statute making it a misdemeanor to be found drunk
while in a public place could not be applied to the chronic alcoholic since he
lacked the "evil intent" and "consciousness of wrongdoing" necessary to con-
stitute mens rea.53 Significantly, the court found that Robinson also compelled
such a result,54 noting that while "[t]he California statute criminally punished
a 'status'--drug addiction-involuntarily assumed; the North Carolina Act crim-
inally punishes an involuntary symptom of a status-public intoxication."Ot
In the same year as the Driver decision, the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia, in Easter v. District of Columbia," also found chronic alco-
holism a defense to the charge of public drunkenness. In his concurring opinion,
however, Justice McGowan emphasized that the court was relying on common
law grounds--its "authority and duty to shape the criminal jurisprudence of
the District of Columbia in accordance with civilized notions of justice" 57-
rather than on the Robinson rationale. Focusing on the definition of an alco-
holic in the District of Columbia Code,58 the court found a defense to criminal
responsibility for the chronic alcoholic based on his inability to conform his
conduct to the requirements of the law.59
The precedential value of Driver and Easter was undermined quickly by the
51. Indeed, crimes such as vagrancy, or being a common prostitute, thief or drunkard
have long been held punishable on the theory that the condition or status involved in each
embodies the wrongful, repetitive acts of the accused. Niebel 8; Cruel & Unusual Punish-
ment 650. "Aside from statutes punishing addiction, probably the only laws that would be
void under a pure status theory are those few statutes that define vagrancy, being a
'common drunkard,' and other status crimes defined in terms of personal characteristics;
most status crimes require by definition the commission of specified acts." Id. (footnote
omitted).
52. 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966).
53. Id. at 764.
54. Id. at 764-65.
55. Id. (emphasis added).
56. 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
57. Id. at 60 (McGowan, J., concurring). The court indicated that its decision would
be the same even if it were not construing a statute because of mens tea requirements. Id.
at 53.
58. Chronic alcoholic is defined as "any person who chronically and habitually uses
alcoholic beverages to the extent that he has lost the power of self-control with respect to
the use of such beverages . .. ." Rehabilitation of Alcoholics Act of 1947, D.C. Code Ann.
§ 24-502 (1961 ed.) (quoted in 361 F.2d at 52) (amended and renumbered as § 24-522(1),
D.C. Code Ann. (Supp. V, 1972)).
59. The court, in discussing the traditional requirement for finding mens rea, stated:
"An essential element of criminal responsibility is the ability to avoid the conduct specified
in the definition of the crime. Action within the definition is not enough." 361 F.2d at 52.
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Supreme Court's decision in Powell v. Texas ° which upheld the conviction of
a chronic alcoholic for being in a state of intoxication in a public place. Spe-
cifically rejecting the broad reading given Robinson by the dissent-that
"[c]riminal penalties may not be inflicted upon a person for being in a condi-
tion he is powerless to change""'-Mr. Justice Marshall concluded that only a
narrow interpretation of Robinson could keep the "Court from becoming, under
the aegis of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, the ultimate arbiter of
the standards of criminal responsibility, in diverse areas of the criminal law,
throughout the country. 62
Despite the apparent definitiveness of the Powell decision, a number of fac-
tors, such as the inadequacy of the trial record for fashioning an important
constitutional decision,63 obscured the Court's holding. 4 It is submitted that
despite the outcome in Powell, the same constitutional defect exists in punish-
ing the chronic alcoholic for acts which are symptomatic of his disease as exists
in punishing the narcotic addict for the acts of his addiction; namely, that in
both cases the accused is in reality being punished for "a condition which he
had no capacity to change or avoid."r5 When viewed from this perspective,
addiction and alcoholism can be positioned with insanity and other traditional
lack of capacity defenses-a point which is illustrated cogently by the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals' recent decision in United States v. Brawner.00
In Brawner, in sweeping language, quoting first Blackstone and then Moris-
sette v. United States, the court declared:
"free will" is the postulate of responsibility under our jurisprudence .... The
60. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
61. Id. at 567 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 533. In a 5-4 decision, Justice Marshall clearly interpreted Robinson on nar-
row status/act grounds. Id. at 532-33. Distinguishing Powell from Robinson, he noted that
Powell had not been convicted of chronic alcoholism but of being drunk in public. Id. at
532. Thus, the decision was considered entirely consistent with the Robinson "Interpreta-
tion of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause ... that criminal penalties may be
inflicted only if the accused has committed some act, has engaged in some behavior, which
society has an interest in preventing, or perhaps in historical common law terms, has com-
mitted some actus reus." Id. at 533. (italics deleted).
63. Id. at 521.
64. Among the obscuring factors was Marshall's indication in dicta that a defense to
the charge of public intoxication might be made out if the alcoholic could prove "loss of
control" once he had begun to drink and "inability to abstain" in the first place. Id. at
524-25. In addition, Mr. Justice White's concurring opinion, which gave the Court its
majority, turned solely on his belief that Powell had not proved that he was compelled by
his addiction to be in a public place. Id. at 549. The Justice actually expressed his opinion
that Robinson would compel the opposite result in a case where such compulsion had been
proved. Id. at 551-52. In Law & Social Change, supra note 4, at 147, White's opinion is
referred to as the "White-Dissent Model." For a general discussion of the ways in which
the Powell decision can be read see Greenawalt 927-37; Law & Social Change 146-48;
Punishment, supra note 4, at 333-34.
65. 392 U.S. at 568 (Fortas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
66. 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc).
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concept of "belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty
of the normal individual to choose between good and evil" is a core concept that is
"universal and persistent in mature systems of law."07
The court itself wondered "how best to express the free will concept in the
light of the expansion of medical knowledge." 08 The Model Penal Code test
upon which it settled,6 9 phrased as it is in terms of the lack of capacity to con-
form one's conduct to the requirements of the law, brought the insanity defense
more closely in line with the principle underlying the defense of chronic alco-
holism as set forth in Easter.70 The court's reliance on Morissette, with its
mens rea implications, 71 seemed to point toward the availability of a common
law defense of addiction for possession or purchase of narcotics for one's per-
sonal use. The court did, however, add one cautious caveat. It considered, but
rejected, the suggestion that the jury should be instructed to acquit whenever
it finds that the defendant's mental or emotional processes and behavioral con-
trols have been so impaired that "he cannot 'justly be held responsible.' "72 The
extension of Brawner to other "conditions," the court stated, would have to be
handled on a case-by-case basis.
V. EmERGENCE OF THE DRUG DEPENDENCE DEFENSE
A. Pre-Moore Development
The drug dependence defense currently proposed is patterned after the Model
Penal Code's new insanity test.73 A defendant who, because of his repeated use
of narcotics, is unable to conform thus can establish a defense to criminal pun-
ishment for acts such as possession, purchase and use of narcotics." This de-
67. Id. at 985, quoting 4 Blackstone's Commentaries 27 and Morrissette v. United States,
342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952).
68. 471 F.2d at 986.
69. 471 F.2d at 973. Subsection 1 of § 4.01 was the focal point of the court's de.cison
in Brawner. It reads: "A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of
such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to
appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of the law." Model Penal Code § 4.01(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). The
District of Columbia Court of Appeals became the tenth circuit to adopt the new test. For
a listing of cases in other jurisdictions see 471 F.2d at 979. For a synopsis of the previous
history of the insanity defense in the District of Columbia see note 80 infra.
70. See notes 58-59 supra and accompanying text.
71. See Part IME supra.
72. 471 F2d at 986.
73. See text accompanying note 70 supra.
74. The drug dependence defense is set forth in full in the text accompanying note 113
infra. This version of the defense was first articulated in United States v. Moore. Moore
Slip Opinion 2. The defense was proposed only for "acts which ... are inseparable from
the disease itself and, at the same time, inflict no direct harm upon other members of
society." Id. at 246 (Wright, J., dissenting). In his dissent in Powell, Mir. Justice Fortas
stated that "a person may not be punished if the condition essential to constitute the
defined crime is part of the pattern of his disease and is occasioned by a compulsion
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fense had its genesis and most thorough articulation in the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia. 7r The first major consideration given to the de-
fense was in 1964 in Castle v. United States.78
In Castle, in response to a prosecution under the Harrison Narcotic Act" and
the Jones-Miller Act,78 defendant urged the defense of "pharmacological duress,"
introducing impressive expert testimony to show that narcotics addiction in-
volved "'an overpowering desire or need ... to continue taking the drug and
to obtain it by any means.' "79 Importantly, the court would hear testimony on
symptomatic of the disease." 392 U.S. at 569. Elsewhere Mr. Justice Fortas indicated that
a drug dependence defense did not preclude imposition of punishment for other "inde-
pendent acts" which "do not typically flow from and are not part of the syndrome of the
disease." Id. at 559 n.2; accord, Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761, 764-65 (4th Cir. 1966)
(alcoholism). The non-trafficking addict can raise the issue of lack of capacity as an
affirmative defense at trial or by a pretrial motion to dismiss. The defendant would be
charged with going forward with the evidence; but the government would have the burden
of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt. Moore Slip Opinion 249-50 (Wright, J., dis-
senting). The district court has pointed out that the requirement that the addict move
forward with the evidence might necessitate a bifurcated trial. United States v. Ashton, 317
F. Supp. 860, 862 (D.D.C. 1970).
75. The court has confronted the issue directly at least six times. See Lloyd v. United
States, 343 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 952 (1965) and cases cited at
note 8 supra. For a solid discussion of the court's handling of the drug issue see Note,
Criminal Law: Watson-The First Step Towards More Humane Treatment of Narcotic
Addicts in the Courts of the District of Columbia, 17 How. L.J. 188 (1971). Other courts
which have dealt with the issue include, e.g., Bailey v. United States, 386 F.2d 1 (5th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 946 (1968); United States v. Malafronte, 357 F.2d 629 (2d
Cir. 1966) (alcoholism); Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966) (alcoholism).
76. 347 F.2d 492 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 929 (1965). The court actually
had resolved the issue against the defense without discussion except for Chief Judge Baze-
Ion's dissent in Lloyd v. United States, 343 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381
U.S. 952 (1965); and his reluctant concurring opinion in Hawkins v. United States, 288
F.2d 122 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
77. Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 4704(a), ch. 736, 68A Stat. 550, repealed by the Compre-
hensive Drug Abuse Prevention & Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-513, tit. III, § 1101(b)
(3)(A), 84 Stat. 1292 [hereinafter cited as Comprehensive Drug Act]. The Harrison Act
prohibited, among other things, purchasing narcotics not in the original stamped package.
78. Boggs Act, of 1951, ch. 666, 65 Stat, 767, repealed by the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention & Control Act, Pub. L. 91-513, tit. III, § 1101 (a)(2), 84 Stat. 1291. The Jones-
Miller Act prohibited the importation of narcotic drugs contrary to law. It is important to
note that Castle was charged only with possession of 11 capsules of narcotics which were
found in a dresser drawer in his bedroom. The quantity was only enough to satisfy his daily
habit. 347 F.2d at 493. Conviction was based on the presumption raised by possession in
the Boggs Act. Chief Judge Bazelon had noted earlier in his concurrence in Hawkins
that "[fihe statutory presumptions that make virtually every possessor of narcotics a
'pusher,' have caught appellant in a web of legislation, which is primarily designed to
deter and punish professional peddlers and 'traffickers' in narcotics." Hawkins v. United
States, 288 F.2d 122, 124 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (footnotes omitted).
79. 347 F.2d at 493. The term "pharmacological duress" has become popular in the
literature on the drug dependence defense since Castle. E.g., Note on Dependence as a
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pharmacological duress only in the context of the insanity defense.8 0 In addi-
tion to his analogy to the common law notions of duress and compulsion, 8'
defendant urged that the Robinson decision should be extended to acts as closely
related to addiction as purchase, possession and concealment for one's own use.8
On appeal, the court affirmed Castle's conviction, holding that the evidence
submitted to the jury did not require a finding of a mental defect which would
Defense to Unlawful Possession, II Working Papers of the National Commission on the
Reform of the Criminal Laws 1132 [hereinafter cited as II Working Papers]; Emerging
Recognition, supra note 4; Law & Social Change, supra note 4.
80. Up to the time of the Castle decision, drug dependence per se did not raise the
issue of criminal responsibility in the District of Columbia, and it was not considered
"some evidence" of mental disease or defect, which was the principal component of the
Durham-McDonald insanity test then in existence in the District of Columbia. Heard v.
United States, 348 F.2d 43, 44 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (per curiam). "[N]arcotis addiction, without
more, does not constitute 'some evidence' of mental disease or 'insanity' so as to raise the
issue of criminal responsffbity." Id. Proof of the necessary accompanying mental disfunction
which Heard required was accomplished in Horton v. United States, 317 F.2d 595 (D.C. Cir.
1963), and in other cases gathered in Heard, 348 F.2d at 49 n.3. See Capacity Defense, supra
note 4, at 145 n.82.
Since Castle, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has held that heroin de-
pendence may have probative value along with other evidence of mental disease in raising the
insanity issue. Gaskins v. United States, 410 F.2d 987, 989 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Green v. United
States, 383 F.2d 199, 201 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 961 (1968); see Bailey v.
United States, 386 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 946 (1968) ; United States
v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966). The Durham-McDonald insanity test evolved in
two decisions of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. Durham v. United States, 214
F.2d 862, 874-75 (D.C. Cir. 1954), overruled, United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 971
(D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc): "[A]n accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act
was the product of mental disease or mental defect;" McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d
847, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (en banc): "[T]he jury should be told that a mental disease or de-
fect includes any abnormal condition of the mind which substantially affects mental or
emotional processes and substantially impairs behavior controls." For a discussion of the
Durham-McDonald rule as it relates to the criminal responsibility of narcotics addicts see
Bowman, Narcotic Addiction and Criminal Responsibility Under Durham, 53 Geo. L.J. 1017
(1965).
81. The court cited Gillars v. United States, 182 F.2d 962, 976 & n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1950),
and Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 908 (1955) in support of its duress theory. 347 F.2d at 494. While
the court recognized that duress is normally the result of external forces, it suggested that
an active addict's apprehension of major withdrawal symptoms might constitute duress. Id.
This theory does not seem to have been advanced in any major way since. But see Heard
v. United States, 348 F.2d 43 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (per curianm). The court in Heard implied
that impairment of behavior could occur as a result of deprivation of heroin, and might be
grounds for a defense to criminal responsibility. Id. at 45-46. For a recent article which views
this concept as the basis of the drug dependence defense see Law & Social Change 153-54,
wherein the author suggests that "the proper rule is to excuse those whose act is in response
to any threatened harm which would have induced a man of reasonable firmness to do what
the accused did." Id. at 154.
82. 347 F.2d at 495.
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negate criminal responsibility. 3 The court also held that appellant had objected
improperly to the failure to submit the issue of pharmacological duress at the
trial court level.84 Castle clearly established that the court of appeals was not
yet ready to consider a drug dependence defense independently from the in-
sanity defense, and that it was unwilling to extend the Robinson decision be-
yond the specific facts of that case without further guidance from the Supreme
Court.8" The refusal to extend Robinson, however, must be juxtaposed with
the same court's ruling less than a year and one half later, in Easter,s0 which
was replete with the language of the Robinson Court. Statements in the major-
ity decision in Easter such as "[a] sick person is a sick person though he ex-
posed himself to contagion .. .,, make clear that the court was influenced by
the broader implications of Robinson even though it had construed that deci-
sion strictly when applying it to a narcotics addict in Castle.88
The next major opportunity afforded the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia to clarify its position on the responsibility of the drug addict for
the acts of his addiction, and to harmonize that position with the less stringent
approach it had taken to chronic alcoholics in Easter, came in 1970 in Watson
v. United States.89 Watson, like Castle, was charged with possession of narcotic
drugs. 0 The principal defense urged in the lower court was the absence of guilt
by reason of insanity,91 although counsel also urged acquittal at the comple-
tion of testimony on the grounds that under the Robinson decision "'it would
be improper to criminally incarcerate an addict for his addiction.' "02 The court
refused to direct an acquittal on grounds of insanity, and dismissed, almost out
of hand, counsel's constitutional argument based on Robinson that if the eighth
amendment forbids punishment of an addict for his addiction per se, it also
forbids punishment for an act as closely related to addiction as possession. 3
On appeal, Watson asserted that due process of law required the court to
recognize a defense of addiction based on the involuntary character of acts
83. 347 F.2d at 493-95.
84. Id. at 494.
85. Id.
86. 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
87. Id. at 53.
88. Two important differences in the court's handling of drug addiction in Castle must
be emphasized. First, the court in Easter did not insist that alcoholism be dealt with in
the context of the insanity test, accepting instead the analogy to the common law defenses
of duress and compulsion. Secondly, the court chose the common law route for implement-
ing the dicta in Robinson rather than seeking to extend the protection of the eighth amend-
ment to acts outside of the disease itself.
89. 439 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (en banc). For general discussion of the Watson case
see Emerging Recognition, supra note 4; First Step, supra note 4; Law & Social Change,
supra note 4.
90. Like Castle, Watson possessed only enough narcotics to maintain his habit-i3
capsules. 439 F.2d at 444.
91. Id. at 445.
92. Id. at 446.
93. Id. at 446 n.4.
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compelled by such addiction.9 4 Neither the government nor the court directly
confronted this issue, however, focusing instead on the eighth amendment
grounds originally advanced by the defense. The government followed the nar-
row status/act reading of Robinson and argued simply that appellant stood
charged with purchase and sale of narcotics, not addiction per se. 5 Any exten-
sion of Robinson, the government argued, in view of the court's own holding
in Castle, must come from the Supreme Court itself Y The court agreed with
the last contention97 and dismissed the due process argument by stating that
insanity and "pharmacological duress" were alternative defenses.9 8 The court
seemed to indicate that it viewed the due process basis of the drug dependence
defense as the constitutional equivalent of the common law mens rea argument
made in Castle.
One important additional question was brought to the attention of the en
banc court. Appellant argued for the first time that "the origins and subsequent
history of the Jones-Miller and Harrison Acts [showed] that Congress never
intended the substantive provisions under which appellant was convicted to
apply to one who is shown to be only an addict-possessor."'99 In essence, it was
this argument which triggered and crystallized the distinction which is now
being made by proponents of the drug dependence defense between trafficking
and non-trafficking addicts. 19° If Robinson meant anything, appellant argued,
94. Id. at 447. Presumably appellant's argument here was based on the substantive as-
pect of due process often expressed as "fairness." The connotation is that it is inherently
unfair to punish someone for a condition he is powerless to change. Justice Fortas urged
this point in his dissent in Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. at 567-68, although he did not urge
a due process basis for the drug dependence defense. See text accompanying note 65 supra.
What the due process argument essentially comes down to is the "constitutionalization" of
mens rea. See Packer, supra note 9, at 151; notes 21 & 25 supra. At least one commentator
has urged the use of procedural due process to protect the compulsive violator of narcotics
laws. His argument is that, just as due process protects the insane person from being
treated as a criminal in that it protects the privilege of pleading insanity, it ought to pro-
tect the addict by allowing him to plead his compulsion. Neibel, supra note 4, at 7.
95. 439 F.2d at 447. These "acts," according to the government, were excluded from
the Robinson rationale by the very words of the decision. "A State might impose criminal
sanctions, for example, against the unauthorized manufacture, prescription, sale, purchase,
or possession of narcotics within its borders." 370 U.S. at 664.
96. 439 F.2d at 447; see Castle v. United States, 347 F.2d at 495.
97. 439 F.2d at 447. The court was particularly wary of extending Robinson because of
the Powell decision; however, it read Powell not as definitively precluding a drug depend-
ence defense based on eighth amendment grounds, but at the very least as placing a bea y
burden of proof upon the defendant who urged it. Id. The court felt that Watson, like
Powell, had not met that burden.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 449.
100. Appellant argued that the proper distinction to be made was not one between
addicts and non-addicts, as asserted by the government, but between trafficking and non-
trafficking addicts. Id. at 452-53 & n.9. Punishing the non-trafficking addict possessor for
acts which are inherent in his addiction such as possession, purchase, and use of narcotics
is in reality punishing addiction itself. Justice White commented in his concurring opinion
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it must mean that "(1) Congress either did not intend to expose the non-
trafficking addict possessor to criminal punishment, or (2) its effort to do so
is as unavailing constitutionally as that of the California legislature." 10' While
the court held that the record was insufficient to allow a definitive ruling, dearly
it was impressed by this phase of appellant's argument and explicitly urged this
method of attacking such an application of the statutes in the future.10 2 The
court stated that only through an adequate adversary proceeding would the
Supreme Court be provided with an adequate record to explain "how it is that
California may not, consistently with the Federal Constitution, prosecute a
person for being an addict, but the United States can criminally prosecute an
addict for possession of narcotics for his personal use."'03
With Brawner and Easter pointing toward the possibility of a drug depen-
dence defense based on the lack of capacity to conform one's conduct to the
requirements of the law, and Watson suggesting that federal narcotics legisla-
tion might be held unconstitutional on eighth amendment grounds if applied to
the non-trafficking addict-possessor, the case of Raymond Moore' 04 arrived at
the court of appeals.
B. United States v. Moore
Moore was indicted on four counts under the same provisions of the Harri-
son and Jones-Miller Acts as Watson and Castle. Although he was found in
possession of fifty capsules of a heroin mixture, 10 5 the evidence as to whether
he was also engaged in trafficking was inconclusive.' 00 At trial, the court re-
fused to allow the jury to hear expert medical testimony regarding Moore's
"compulsion to obtain and use heroin," apparently since the evidence was not
in Powell that "[p]unishing an addict for using drugs convicts for addiction under a differ-
ent name." 392 U.S. at 548.
101. 439 F.2d at 452.
102. Id. at 453-54. The court suggested that the primary attack when an addict thinks
statutes do not apply to him should be by a motion to dismiss. If the defendant raised
this question as an affirmative defense at trial, he would have to bear the burden of going
forward with the evidence to place himself in the category of an addict in possession of
narcotics solely for his own use. The burden of persuasion would be on the prosecution If
it disputed the evidence. If the court ruled as a matter of law that the statute did not or
could not constitutionally encompass non-trafficking possessors for personal use, an Indict-
ment not alleging trafficking would be subject to dismissal. Id.
103. Id. at 454 (emphasis added).
104. Moore Slip Opinion.
105. Id. at 5. The facts of the case are quoted from the Brief for Appellant at 22-26.
106. The arresting officer, who was the principal witness at the trial, admitted that "lie
had no personal knowledge that appellant was engaged in drug trafficking, that no tests
had been conducted to determine if appellant's fingerprints were on the paraphernalia in
the room, that no tests were conducted to determine if heroin powder was present on
appellant's hands, and that he had not checked the hotel register and had no way of
knowing whether appellant was in any way connected with the room in which he was
arrested." Moore Slip Opinion 7-8. The officer also testified that some addicts require 50-
100 capsules of heroin a day to sustain their habits. Id. at 8.
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introduced in the context of the insanity defense.' 0 7 The court also declined to
instruct the jury at defendant's request that a non-trafficking addict could not
be convicted under the statutes involved in the case, 08 and rejected a motion
to dismiss on the basis of Watson because there was "sufficient evidence of
trafficking to permit the case to go to the jury."'1 9 Subsequently, Moore was
found guilty.110
Carefully following the implications of the court's line of reasoning in Easter
and the dicta in Watson, Moore made the following arguments in support of
the drug dependence defense on appeal: 1) the exercise of free will is absent
in the consumption-related offenses of possession, purchase and use, because the
addict is driven to perform those acts by an "overpowering compulsion;"
2) Congress never intended federal narcotics legislation to punish the non-
trafficking addict for possession of narcotics in small quantities for personal
use; and 3) that if the statutes were held to sanction punishment of the addict
for personal use, they would be unconstitutional under Robinson and Powell.
Importantly, appellant did not assert an insanity defense although the court
would have allowed testimony on that issue."' Instead he relied heavily on the
existence of the common law defense, and, in the alternative, the eighth amend-
ment protection assertedly provided by Robinson.
In a 5-4 plurality opinion," 2 the conviction was affirmed. The four dissent-
ing judges would have remanded for the jury to consider whether, at the time
of the offense, the defendant, "as a result of his repeated use of narcotics, lacked
substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law,"113
urging, in essence, a new test of criminal responsibility for the non-trafficking
107. Id. at 8. See note 82 supra.
108. Moore Slip Opinion 9.
109. Id. at 8.
110. Moore was found guilty on all four counts. Id. at 148 n.4 (Wright, J., dissenting):
"The first count charged that both appellant and Sherman Beverly [who was also in the
room] purchased, dispensed and distributed the loose and capsuled heroin found on
the bed in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 4704(a). The second count alleged that they had re-
ceived, concealed and facilitated concealment of this same heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 174.... Only appellant [Moore] was charged in the remaining two counts. Under the
third count, he was charged with having purchased, dispensed and distributed the heroin
contained in the So capsules found in his pocket in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 4704(a). The
fourth count alleged that he had received, concealed and facilitated concealment of the
heroin in his pocket in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 174." Moore was committed for a de.
termination of his suitability for treatment under the N.A.R.A., 18 U.S.C. § 4251 (1970).
Id. at 9. See also note 8 supra for relevant text. Upon his rejection for N.A.RA. treatment,
he was sentenced to terms of two to six years on the Harrison and six years on the Jones-
Miller violation. Moore Slip Opinion 9.
111. Moore Slip Opinion 155 n.12 (dissenting opinion).
112. Judges Wilkey, MacKinnon, and Robb voted to affirm all convictions and sen-
tences. Judges Leventhal and McGowan voted to affirm the conviction but remand for
possible reconsideration under N.A.RA. The four dissenters were Judges Wright, Tamm,
Robinson, and Chief Judge Bazelon.
113. Moore Slip Opinion 249 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
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narcotic addict analogous to the court's recent formulation of the insanity de-
fense.
The arguments against the common law basis of the defense made in both
the majority and concurring opinions focused on the practical inability of the
courts-if the defense were established-to determine what drug dependent
persons would fall into the class to be excused, and what crimes logically could
be excluded. 1 4 judge Wilkey, speaking for the majority,"r0 pointed out the
extremely subjective nature of a determination that a particular addict has lost
his power of self-control." 06 Judge Leventhal's opinion emphasized that prob-
lems of verification and widespread assertion would be particularly acute be-
cause the defense was proposed where either "psychic" or "physiological" de-
pendence was involved. 1 7 His conclusion that from a practical point of view,
given the "limited time and resources available for prosecution and trial,"' 18
no determination of which addicts had lost the ability of self-control could in
fact be made," 9 expresses an opinion with which the majority was no doubt in
114. In general, the class of drug users for whom the drug dependence defense Is urged
is limited to non-trafficking addicts, and the class of crimes is limited to consumption-
related offenses. The National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse characterizes the
class of drug dependent persons for whom the defense is urged as "compulsive users."
Compulsive drug use, according to the Commission, is characterized by a high degree of
psychological and, in some cases, physical dependence. The compulsive user is preoccupied
with obtaining enough of the addictive substance to ward off the physical discomfort or
psychological dislocation that results from discontinuance of use. Second Report, supra note
1, at 31-32. Most heroin users fall within this class. See id. at 97. In terms of federal
narcotics legislation, these users are "addicts," defined as those who are so far addicted to
their use of narcotic drugs as to have lost the power of self-control with respect to their
addiction. This is the definition used in both the N.A.R.A., 28 U.S.C. § 2901 (1) (1970) and
the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 802 (1) (1970). Note the similarity to the defini-
tion of chronic alcoholic in the D.C. Code. See note 58 supra. Implicit in this definition of
addiction is that in order to be eligible to raise the drug dependence defense, the addict
must be both unable to control his acts when on drugs and unable to abstain from taking
them in the first place. This limitation on the defense is implicit in Justice White's con-
curring opinion in Powell, 392 U.S. at 552 & n.4 and in Justice Fortas' dissenting opinion,
id. at 570. The majority itself took this position in dicta. See note 64 supra. The district
court specifically read this into the defense on the basis of Powell. United States v. Lindsey,
324 F. Supp. 55, 58 (D.D.C. 1971).
115. Judge Wilkey believed that there was sufficient evidence of trafficking to convict
Moore on that ground, but he did not try to avoid the central issue on that basis, and
instead stated specifically, "even if we were to assume that appellant was a simple addict
and nothing more, we believe that his conviction must be sustained." Moore Slip Opinion
9-10.
116. The judge stated: "Drug addiction of varying degrees may or may not result In
loss of self-control, depending on the strength of character opposed to the drug craving."
Id. at 13.
117. Id. at 95. One can be a "compulsive user" and fall within the definition of addict
without necessarily being physically addicted. Second Report 31; see note 114 supra.
118. Moore Slip Opinion 95.
119. judge Wilkey stated that expert opinion indicates that even those with "'great
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sympathy. In addition, Judge Wilkey argued that the addict who robs a bank,
to whom the defense is not available, might in fact be exhibiting a greater loss
of self-control than the "possessor-acquirer,"' 20 thus highlighting the danger
that the defense would be extended to "all other illegal acts of any type
whose purpose was to obtain narcotics for his own use .... ,121
In general, Judge Leventhal's objection in his concurring opinion to the
establishment of the drug dependence defense rested on his belief that the ele-
ments of a voluntary act and an appropriate mental state necessary for the
imputation of guilt were met by the offense of knowing possession of narcotics. a22
This objective, cognitive standard of criminal responsibility was seen by the
judge as the only way in which criminal capacity can be measured evenhandedly.
He concluded that "[t]he criminal law cannot 'vary legal norms with the in-
dividual's capacity to meet the standards they prescribe, absent a disability that
is both gross and verifiable .. . ! ' 2"
Turning to the appellant's second argument, the court refused to hold that
Congress never intended federal statutes to apply to possession by the non-
trafficking addict for his own use since there was no specific expression by Con-
gress of their intent to exclude non-trafficking addicts.'-' More importantly,
the court believed that Congress' enactment of the Controlled Substances Act
prohibiting possession by any person precluded the establishment of the de-
fense.'25 Strongly dissenting from the court's latter holding, Judge Wright ar-
clinical experience' would have difficulty making such a determination. Id. at 90-91, citing
Note on Dependence as a Defense to Unlawful Possession (from the Consultant's Report of
Prof. Rosenthal), 11 Working Papers, supra note 79, at 1137-38.
120. Moore Slip Opinion 13.
12L Id. at 11-12. Chief Judge Bazelon in fact suggested in dissent that the defense
should be extended to all acts compelled by one's addiction. Id. at 253.
122. Id. at 83-84. In support of this argument, he pointed to § 2.01(4) of the Model
Penal Code which states that the requirements of a "voluntary act" are met by possession as
an act "if the possessor knowingly procured or received the thing possessed or was aware
of his control thereof for a sufficient period to have been able to terminate his possession."
Model Penal Code § 2.01(4), (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (quoted in Moore Slip
Opinion 84 n.62).
123. Moore Slip Opinion 84-85, quoting Model Penal Code § 2.09, Comment (Tent.
Draft No. 10, 1960), at 6. It was the existence of a "gross and verifiable" disability in the
form of the "mental disease or defect" requirement of the insanity test that led Judge
Leventhal to distinguish the "lack of capacity" defense allowed in Brawner from the one
rejected by the court in Moore. The requirement of a "mental disease or defect" in the
insanity test, according to Judge Leventhal, was exactly the kind of limitation the drug
dependence test lacks. Reading that requirement out of the law, as appellant in Moore
essentially requested, he concluded, would establish the "'all-embracing unified field"' de-
fense that was rejected by the court in Brawner. Moore Slip Opinion 87-88, quoting United
States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 995 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
124. Moore Slip Opinion 35.
125. Id. at 36. 21 U.S.C. § 844 (a) (1970) makes it unlawful for any person knowingly or
intentionally to possess a controlled substance unless obtained by prescription or from a
doctor. The majority also quoted the preamble to the District of Columbia Rehabilitation
of Users of Narcotics Statute (D.C. Code § 24-601 (1967)): "'The Congress intends that
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gued that at most Congress had taken a neutral position with respect to the
drug dependence defense.126 Noting that possession of narcbtics per se was not
made a crime under federal law until 1970,127 he emphasized that all federal
narcotics legislation since the Harrison Act has been primarily concerned with
the trafficker.128 Reversing the majority's argument, he pointed to the govern-
ment's own admission in its brief that "'Congress has not expressly provided
that addiction shall not be an affirmative defense to a charge of possessing
illicit narcotics ... . ,,129 In concluding that the drug dependence defense should
be recognized, Judge Wright argued that statutes purporting to punish addic-
tion would otherwise be constitutionally suspect' 80 and "legal concepts of crime
and punishment" would have failed to keep pace with evolving standards of
decency.' 3 '
In the end it was Judge Wright's constitutional argument that drew most of
the court's attention. The majority rejected Robinson as precedent for uphold-
ing the drug dependence defense on two grounds: 1) the familiar status/act
distinction,' 82 and 2) the fact that the majority in Robinson did not base its
decision on compulsion or the loss of self-control.' 83 In regard to this second
ground, the court quoted from Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Robinson
that "'addiction alone cannot reasonably be thought to amount to more than a
compelling propensity to use narcotics .... " ,114 Accordingly, Robinson was
found to stand for the proposition that it is the "craving" that cannot be pun-
ished and "not the acts which give in to that craving."'83 In a rather murky
conclusion to this argument, Judge Wilkey stated that a "'compelling propen-
sity to use narcotics' . . . is not necessarily an irresistible urge to have them."'8 0
Federal criminal laws shall be enforced against drug users as well as other persons, and
sections 24-601 to 24-611 shall not be used to substitute treatment for punishment in
cases of crime committed by drug users."' Moore Slip Opinion 32.
126. Moore Slip Opinion 241-42 (dissenting opinion).
127. Id. at 241. See 21 U.S.C. § 844 (1970) & note 125 supra.
128. judge Wright's opinion contained an extensive discussion of the history of nar-
cotics legislation, Moore Slip Opinion 157-87, as well as a more specific discussion of
legislative intent only to punish trafficking addicts, id. at 230-42. He also pointed out that
Congress knew of the Watson challenge at the time it enacted the 1970 act and still did
not specifically preclude the drug dependence defense. Id. at 241.
129. Id. at 230 (quoting Brief for Appellee at 45).
130. This is based on the argument that statutes must be construed, wherever pos-
sible, to avoid unconstitutionality. Id. at 209.
131. Id. at 242.
132. See text accompanying, and cases collected in, note 47 supra.
133. Moore Slip Opinion 20-21.
134. Id. at 21 (emphasis omitted), quoting from Robinson, 370 U.S. at 678-79. Justice
Clark, dissenting in Robinson, stated: "[ilt is no answer to suggest that we are dealing with
an involuntary status and thus penal sanctions will be ineffective and unfair. The section at
issue applies only to persons who use narcotics often or even daily but not to the point of
losing self-control." 370 U.S. at 684.
135. Moore Slip Opinion 22.
136. Id. (footnote omitted).
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Nor did the court find Powell compelling precedent for the drug defense.
While allowing that the idea that "it was not criminal to give in to the irre-
sistible compulsions of a 'disease,' weave[d] in and out of . ..Powell ... ","
Judge Wilkey insisted that there was "no Supreme Court holding to [that]
effect."' 38 In addition, Judge Wilkey pointed to two other grounds for distin-
guishing Powell. First of all, and very simply, Powell's acts were held punish-
able; and secondly, Powell's initial act, his taking of the first drink, was not
illegal as is the injection of narcotic drugs.' 39 According to Wilkey, "illegal
acquisition and possession are thus the direct product of a freely willed illegal
act."140
Wilkey concluded, as so many courts have concluded since the Robinson and
Powell decisions, that any extension of the eighth amendment prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment to encompass the drug addiction defense
must come from the Supreme Court itself.' 41 It was largely on this basis that
the court refused to change what it emphasized was dicta in Watson into a firm
ruling "that Robinson represents a constitutional bar to conviction of a non-
trafficking addict-possessor."''1 2
The dissent's analysis of the Robinson and Powell decisions, in an attempt to
establish an eighth amendment ground for the drug addiction defense, focused
on the categorization of drug addiction as a disease characterized by the loss of
self-control, 143 rather than on the status/act distinction on which the majority
137. Id.
138. Id. Justice Marshall stated for the majority in Powell that Robinson did "not
deal with the question of whether certain conduct cannot constitutionally be punished
because it is, in some sense, 'involuntary' or 'occasioned by a compulsion.'" 392 U.S. at
533.
139. Moore Slip Opinion 23-24.
140. Id. at 24 (emphasis in the original). This part of Judge Wilkey's argument seems
to be based on an Aristotelian theory of excuses which maintains that incapacity to con-
form to the law is no excuse if the incapacity can be attributed to the negligence of the
person incapacitated. Pincoffs, Legal Responsibility and Moral Character, 19 Wayne L.
Rev. 905, 906 (1973). Pincoffs points out the heavily moralistic overtones of such a sys-
tem of excuses in his statement: "We are responsible for making of ourselves beings who
can help doing what we do. We have a moral right to demand--each of us of every other
-honesty, trustworthiness, justice and other qualities as well.. .. It is simply not an
excuse that I can't abide by the law if my inability to do so is my own fault." Id. at 919.
But see Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50, 53 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Frankel, supra
note 4, at 604-05 (addict's punishment cannot be justified by past blameworthiness).
141. Moore Slip Opinion 28; Watson v. United States, 439 F.2d 442, 451 (D.C. Cir.
1970); Bailey v. United States, 386 F.2d 1, 4 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 946
(1968); Castle v. United States, 347 F.2d 492, 495 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S.
929 (1965); United States ex rel. Swanson v. Reincke, 344 F.2d 260, 263 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 869 (1965) (by implication); People v. Zapata, 220 Cal. App. 2d 903, 34
Cal. Rptr. 171 (3d Dist. 1963), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 377 U.S. 406 (1964) (choice
should remain in legislative hands).
142. Moore Slip Opinion 28.
143. The dissent relied on the World Health Organization definition of addiction which
includes the following characteristics:
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heavily relied. More subtly, the dissent argued that if criminal punishment of
a person for the disease of addiction is contrary to the eighth amendment as
violative of "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society,"144 then punishment of an addict for acts symptomatic of the
disease must also be contrary to those standards.145
In the final pages of its opinion, the court made a welcome attempt to dis-
tinguish its holding in Easter from that in Moore. Interestingly, that distinction
was made not on the differences, if any, between the behavior patterns of
chronic alcoholics and narcotic addicts, but on the different goals involved in
dealing with the problems of alcoholism and addiction.1 40 The court found that
the primary goal of punishing the alcoholic was rehabilitative, while that of
punishing the addict was twofold, rehabilitation and "elimination of the addic-
tive substance" by "ferreting out" wholesalers who are its source.147 The court
concluded that:
"(1) an overpowering desire or need to continue taking the drug and to obtain it by any
means... ;
(2) a tendency to increase the dose owing to the development of tolerance;
(3) a psychic dependence on the effects of the drug . . . ;
(4) a physical dependence on the effects of the drug requiring its presence for main-
tenance of homeostasis and resulting in a definite, characteristic, and self-limited abstinence
syndrome when the drug is withdrawn." World Health Organization Expert Committee on
Addiction-Producing Drugs, Thirteenth Report, World Health Organization Technical Re-
port Series No. 273, at 13 (1964). The dissent read Robinson "as holding that narcotics
addiction, like mental illness, leprosy and venereal disease, is an illness and as such can-
not constitutionally be punished as a crime." Moore Slip Opinion 203. The language closely
parallels that used by the Court in Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666-67.
Greenawalt points out that emphasizing the disease aspects of addiction produces a
broader rationale for the Robinson decision. Greenawalt, supra note 4, at 929.
144. The language is that of Chief Justice Warren in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101
(1958) (quoted in Moore Slip Opinion 201).
145. This reading of Robinson is based on the dissent's acceptance of medical opinion
that addiction is a "curious and inexorable process" which "overwhelms" the addict, de-
priving him of the power to control his acts. Moore Slip Opinion 197. Judge Wright rea-
soned that since the two dissenters in Robinson dissented precisely because they did not
feel that Robinson had conclusively proved his loss of self-control, "there was no articu-
lated division within the Court [in Robinson] on the basic principle that imposition of
criminal sanctions on an addict who has lost the power of self-control constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment." Id. at 203 n.165. If one accepts the majority's contention that the
definition of addiction in Robinson did not turn on the loss of self-control to begin with,
see text accompanying notes 133 & 134 supra, Judge Wright's imputation of such reasoning
to the individual justices who concurred in the result seems unwarranted. The dissent's
analysis of Powell is similar to its analysis of Robinson, but seems to be more closely sup-
ported by the actual division within the Powell Court.
146. This is in keeping with the "purpose-of-punishment perspective" characteristic of
the entire majority opinion. The term and the framework of the analysis are from Dubin
346.
147. Moore Slip Opinion 37-38. But see Burnett, supra note 4, at 637 (pointing out that
the result of making the job of the police easier by allowing possession offenses is often a
police dragnet). See also Second Report 255, where the President's Commission points out
that in reality non-trafficking addicts know little about the men at the top.
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The flat prohibition against possession bears a direct logical relationship to both
objectives [of drug legislation]. Making all possession illegal is both to protect the
addict against himself and the public against the drug traffic .... 148
One point of agreement in the court centered around society's inherent right
to promote the general security. Appellant himself admitted that an addict does
not have "'a constitutional or any other legal right to purchase and possess
heroin for injection,' ,,-4' and that society retained the right to attempt "'ade-
quate and appropriate rehabilitative treatment.. . . "'1 One commentator has
observed that a drug dependence defense requires the concomitant development
of non-criminal responsibility resulting in involuntary civil commitment.r
However, the host of procedural problems raised by such commitment pro-
grams,'152 and their notable lack of success has led others to question both their
viability and their constitutionality.1 53 If such programs were found violative
of the due process requirements of the Constitution, and the addiction defense
were established, a paradoxical situation might arise in which the least danger-
ous possessors would be sent to jail while those actually addicted would go
free. 54 On the other hand, the lengthy term of commitment usually associated
with such programs might discourage the addict from asserting the defense at
all, especially in cases where conviction for possession offenses is treated as a
148. Moore Slip Opinion 38 n.71. On the propriety of using the criminal sanction for
the purpose of protecting the addict from himself see Chambliss, Types of Deviance and the
Effectiveness of Legal Sanctions, 1967 Wis. L. Rev. 703, 717 (rejecting idea that addict may
be punished for his own good). See also Second Report 247-48, where the suggestion is
made that the possession or taking of drugs in one's own home may fall within the con-
stitutionally protected zone of privacy of the first, fourth and fifth amendments. This argu-
ment is expanded in Moore & Hager, Drugs & Crime: A Bad Connection?, 3 Yale Rev. L.
& Social Action 228, 239-40 (1973). For a discussion of the pros and cons of this basis of
punishment see Cancellaro & Harriman, Narcotic Addiction and Legal Responsibility: A
Dilemma, 19 Wayne L. Rev. 1041, 1044-45, 1057-58 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Can-
cellaro & Harriman].
149. Moore Slip Opinion 52 (quoting Brief for Appellant at 102).
150. Id.
151. Frankel, supra note 4, at 605-06. This was specifically sanctioned by the Court in
Robinson. 370 US. at 664-65 (dicta). On the other hand, at least one court has stated that
there is no constitutional right to treatment. Smith v. Follette, 445 F.2d 955, 961 (2d Cir.
1971).
152. Of the 34 states that now have civil commitment programs, 24 allow commitment
on the mere showing of addiction without any requirement of proving dangerousness to
society as well. In most of these states, proof of addiction need only be made by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, not beyond a reasonable doubt. Seventeen states allow con-
finement for an indefinite period. Second Report 264-65; see Aronowitz, Civil Commitment
of Narcotic Addicts, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 405, 412-13 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Aronowitz].
153. Aronowitz 424-25. Kramer, The States Versus the Addict: Uncivil Commitment, So
B.U.L. Rev. 1 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Kramer]; Report on Drug Offenses: Sections
1821-1829 (prepared by Prof. Louis B. Schwartz, Staff Director, and Michael P. Rosenthal):
II Working Papers, supra note 79, at 1062. The Supreme Court has indicated its surprise
at the small amount of litigation on civil commitment programs. Jackson v. Indiana, 406
U.S. 715, 737 (1972).
154. II Working Papers, supra note 79, at 1062.
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misdemeanor. 5 5 Society seems caught, then, somewhere between the "hybrid
detention"' 56 of involuntary civil commitment programs in which there is no
evidence that the "method of treatment which the addict would be compelled to
undergo .. . offers any reasonable hope of curing his addiction,"'157 and the
invocation of the criminal sanction where that sanction is questionable on con-
stitutional and common law grounds.
VI. REruRN TO PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIUILITY
The dilemma posed by the drug dependence defense is in many ways an ex-
ample of the classic struggle every society faces in balancing the general security
and the dignity and freedom of the individual. 58 The formulation of the de-
fense posited by the dissent in Moore, resting as it does on the existence of a
compulsion strong enough to destroy freedom of will rather than on the source
of that compulsion,' 59 has the positive effect of basing the imposition of punish-
ment on a single standard of criminal responsibility.' 00 Two key objections to
this formulation, however, have been raised. As the National Commission on
Marihuana and Drug Abuse pointed out:
The personal characteristics of the user, his expectations about the drug experience
and about society's attitudes and possible responses, the setting in which the drug
is used, as well as broader socio-cultural factors, are all major determinants of drug
155. Judge Wright pointed out, for instance, that since Moore had only two years and
two months of his sentence remaining he would be unlikely to apply for civil commitment
which, in his case, would have involved a ten year commitment. Moore Slip Opinion 144-45
n.1.
156. The term is Judge Leventhal's. Id. at 124-25; see Kramer, supra note 153, at 21
(calling the programs "prisons masquerading as treatment facilities").
157. Aronowitz 417.
158. See R. Pound, Criminal Justice in America, 28, 31 (1930); Lyons, Unobvious Ex-
cuses in the Criminal Law, 19 Wayne L. Rev. 925, 933 (1973).
159. Appellant's Petition for Certiorari at 14-15 (draft, on file in Fordham Law Review)
contends that the historical emphasis has always been on the fact rather than the source of
compulsion, and cites Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (alcohol
dependence); United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966) (Insanity); United
States v. McGlue, 26 F. Cas. 1093 (No. 15,679) (C.C.D. Mass. 1851); United States v.
Drew, 25 F. Cas. 913 (No. 14,993) (C.C.D. Mass. 1828) (delerium tremens); People v.
Freeman, 61 Cal. App. 2d 110, 142 P.2d 435 (2d Dist. 1943) (epilepsy); Pribble v. People,
49 Colo. 210, 112 P. 220 (1910) (involuntarily administed drug); State v. McCullough,
114 Iowa 532, 87 N.W. 503 (1901) (kleptomania); State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399 (1869) (dip-
somania) (overruled on other grounds, 56 N.H. 227, 235 (1875)).
160. Salzman v. United States, 405 F.2d 358 (D.C. Cir. 1968). Then Judge Burger in-
dicated in dicta that he felt that the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, at least, was
moving away from differentiating among sources of compulsion. He stated: "[plaralleling
our effort to withdraw from trial-by-label [after Durham] was the corresponding desir-
ability of having expert testimony explain the dynamics of the alleged illness, its develop-
ments, manifestations, and effect on capacity to control behavior and on the mental and
emotional processes of the accused, and, of course, whether the illness had impaired or
destroyed those controls so that the accused was no longer a 'free agent.'" Id. at 363.
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effect and of the individual's capacity to control the effects of the drug through the
exercise of his will.1 1
The multitude and complexity of factors involved in the individual's capacity to
control the effects of drugs has led to the fear that drug addicts will feign loss
of control in order to fall within the prescriptions of the drug defense,"0 2 thus
setting a dangerous person free to repeat anti-social acts.10a This criticism,
however, ignores the use of alternative means of social control such as civil com-
mitment to rehabilitate the addict.10 4 Civil commitment avoids the stigma of
criminal punishment and allows society to achieve its goal of deterring drug
abuse and protecting law-abiding members of the community.165 Moreover, the
drug defense concededly is limited to crimes which, like the act of possession,
cause direct harm only to the addict himself. 166
Judge Wright aptly summarized the ethical principles underlying the drug
addiction defense:
In this age of enlightened correctional philosophy, we now recognize that society
has a responsibility to both the individual and the community to treat the offender
so that upon his release he may function as a productive, law-abiding citizen. And
this is all the more true where, as with the non-trafficking addict possessor, the offender
has acted under the compulsion of a disease.'l 7
This statement is pregnant with both the possibilities and pitfalls of a new
161. Second Report 119.
162. That addiction can be feigned is pointed out in the Report of the National Com-
mission on the Reform of the Criminal Laws, 1 Working Papers, supra note 79, at 1137.
163. The amount of serious crimes committed by addicts is often exaggerated, and a
distinction is usually not made between violent crimes and property crimes. There is evi-
dence of a lower incidence of violent crimes among addicts than in the bulk of the popula-
tion. Aronowitz, supra note 152, at 414; see Hearings on S. Res. 48, S. 1895, S. 2590, S.
2637 Before the Subcomm. to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1969); Second Report 269. Most authorities agree that
the addict's pre-addiction propensities are more important than his addiction per se. See,
e.g., L. Kolb, Drug Addiction: A Medical Problem 17 (1962); S. Levine, Narcotics and
Drug Abuse 309 (1973); II Working Papers 1136-37. For a valuable explanation of the
drug/crime assumption see Moore & Hager, Drugs & Crime: A Bad Connection?, 3 Yale
Rev. L. & Social Action 228, 230-40 (1973).
164. The proponents of the drug dependence defense argue vehemently against the use
of the criminal justice system to isolate and reform the addict. Moore Slip Opinion 221-22.
An amicus brief submitted in Moore stated that the criminal process "leads to an in-
creasing commitment to the drug as an integral component of the lifestyle. By contributing
to the addict's sense of degradation, therefore, the criminal process in effect reinforces the
dynamic of addiction." Brief for the Washington Area Council on Alcoholism and Drug
Abuse as Amicus Curiae at 26, United States v. Moore, No. 71-1252 (D.C. Cir., May
14, 1973). One commentator states in regard to the general conditions of criminal drug sanc-
tions that "[a] dearer case of misapplication of the criminal sanction would be difficult to
imagine." H. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 333 (1968).
165. Moore Slip Opinion 221-22 (Wright, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 246; see note 74 supra.
167. Moore Slip Opinion 222-23 (Wright, J., dissenting).
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philosophy of law and social justice aimed at preventing anti-social conduct
rather than punishing it after the fact.0 8 Such a philosophy as it relates to
drug addiction would place primary emphasis on the state's parens patriae power
to invoke the therapeutic process where invocation of the criminal sanction was
unwarranted. s9 However, one commentator has suggested that the curative-
rehabilitative approach to addiction is really a two-edged sword: it creates the
danger to the individual that he "will be punished, or treated, for what he is
or is believed to be, rather than for what he has done;" °70 and the danger
to society that "the effectiveness of . . . the criminal law as [an instrument]
for influencing behavior so as to avoid the necessity for enforcement proceedings
will be weakened."'1 71
The broader concern of those who criticize the "lack of ability to conform"
test as a unifying principle of criminal responsibility is that emphasis on the
fact of loss of control rather than on the specific cause of such loss of control
will result in a limitless extension of the defense approaching the elimination of
criminal guilt.172 However, it should be noted that the extension of the
168. For a thorough discussion and analysis of a new system of criminal law based on
treatment and preventive social reform rather than punishment see Bayles, supra note 9;
Kittrie, Responsibility and the Therapeutic State, 19 Wayne L. Rev. 873 (1973) [herein-
after cited as Kittrie]. Bayles points out that "it is quite compatible with the concept of
treatment to seek to change a status before it results in undesirable behavior." Bayles 829.
Kittrie finds that this new system focuses on "crime prevention" rather than "crime man-
agement." Kittrie 875.
169. Second Report 266-67. See Cancellaro & Harriman, supra note 148, at 1057-60,
1064; Kittrie. Kittrie suggests that the therapeutic ideal is traceable to the common law
concept of the role of the sovereign as guardian of the people. Id. He also notes that there
currently are four times as many people incarcerated under the state's parens patriao
powers than under its criminal sanctions. Id. at 875.
170. Hart, supra note 9, at 407. Bayles points out the significant differences between
the old system of criminal jurisprudence which emphasized punishment, and the current
trend which stresses treatment. Treatment, he indicates, is appropriate for status; punish-
ment for acts. Punishment prevents the repetition of crime; treatment alters status. Bayles,
supra note 9, at 828-29.
171. Hart 408; see Hawkins, Punishment & Deterrence: The Educative, Moralizing, and
Habituative Effects, 1969 Wis. L. Rev. 550, 552. But see note 15 supra. The dissent's
emphasis on the fact that punishment must be morally justifiable in each and every case
would seem to eliminate what is often thought of as the educative role of the law. Judge
Wright stated: "[In any discussion of deterrence we must recognize that when an indi-
vidual is punished, not for his own good, but to set an example for others, he 'suffers not
for what he has done but on account of other people's tendency to do likewise.' . . . In such
situations, the offender serves simply as a tool in the hands of society, and if punish-
ment premised on considerations of deterrence is to be morally legitimate, the punishment
meted out must be justifiable in light of the gravity of the offense and the culpability of
the offender. . . . Since the addict's possession of narcotics is simply a symptom of his
disease and not an act of 'free will,' however, this conduct cannot properly be deemed
'culpable,' and it would therefore seem inappropriate for society to utilize him as a mere
vehicle through which to deter others." Moore Slip Opinion 219-20 (Wright, J., dissenting).
172. R. Perkins, Criminal Law 740 (2d ed. 1969). With the advancement of sociological
and psychological knowledge has come the belief that fewer and fewer criminals are
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M'Naghten insanity test raised similar criticism, namely that it would encourage
people to give in to impulse, thus lessening the law's generally deterrent effect.'"
The difficult choice of the most effective way to deal with drug addiction is, of
course, a policy decision which rests with the state legislatures, and, in the case
of the federal narcotics laws, with the Congress. At the present time, possession
of narcotic drugs for personal use has been reduced to a misdemeanor in thir-
teen states,'1 74 and involuntary civil commitment programs are in existence in
thirty-four.175 Possession of narcotic drugs is a misdemeanor under federal
law,' 76 and federal civil commitment is provided for under NA.R.A. 77 No
dearer indication of the difficulty of choosing between a system of harsh crim-
inal penalties for possession offenses and civil commitment programs for the
addict can be found than New York State's recent return to a system of man-
datory sentences without the availability of probation or conditional discharge
for certain narcotics offenses.1 78 Acknowledging the right of the legislatures to
make policy choices concerning the proper handling of narcotics crimes, the
courts nonetheless cannot abdicate their responsibility for assessing the fairness
of a legislature's choice once its programs have been enacted into positive law.
In United States v. Moore, for example, the majority's rejection of the drug
addiction defense was in essence a judicial statement that it is "fair" for the
legislature to invoke the criminal sanction against non-trafficking drug addicts
for possession and purchase of narcotics for personal use. The difficulty arises in
determining exactly how the standards of fairness themselves are arrived at. It
is the lack of guidance that the courts have given in this area that has led to
criticism of the judical role in defining the underlying principles of criminal
responsibility in the past.'79 That role has been characterized, as it was in
responsible for their acts. Greenawalt, supra note 4, at 943. Bayles raises the following
interesting questions, "Can most blacks raised in ghettos keep from becoming drug addicts
or turning to crime? Could a white collar embezzler have actually resisted the temptation,
given that society has taught him to seek consumer goods and a higher standard of living?"
Bayles, supra note 9, at 835. See also Lyons, supra note 158; Shuman, The Placebo Cure
for Criminality, 19 Wayne L. Rev. 847 (1973). A deterministic view of mankind, contrary
to the laws usual presumption of free will, would lead one to believe that no one is morally
blameworthy. Greenawalt 943. For a discussion of determinism and free will see Bayles
837-40. Neibel suggests that the controversy over the drug dependence defense is in
essence a struggle between determinists and volitional theorists. Neibel, supra note 4, at 9.
173. Greenawalt 961-63.
174. Second Report 245.
175. Id. at 264.
176. 21 U.S.C. § 844 (1970).
177. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4251-55 (1970).
178. New York Controlled Substances Act, N.Y. Penal Law §§ 60.03, 60.05 (McKinney
Supp. 1973). For a thorough analysis of the history of drug legislation in New York up
to the enactment of the new drug laws see Quinn & McLaughlin, The Evolution and
Present Status of New York Drug Control Legislation, 22 Buffalo L. Rev. 705 (1973). The
authors indicate that the current New York drug laws "augur a return to a strict law
enforcement attitude with respect to drugs and addiction." Id. at 733.
179. Dubin, supra note 9, at 335 states: "The fact that all modem legal systems
recognize the existence of some excusing conditions indicates that some kind of criteria
are operating below the surface of the criminal law." See Hart 430-36.
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Moore, by deference to legislative opinion'8 0 on when the imposition of the
criminal sanction is justified and hence, more broadly, on the contents of the
substantive criminal law.' 8 '
Two standards against which the right of a society to invoke the criminal
sanction should be measured are proposed in United States v. Moore. A third
is implicit in the other two. First, appellant Moore argued in essence that al-
though his acts might have been "voluntary" in the traditional sense, the com-
pulsion to perform the acts was so great as to destroy the free will to choose
between performing or not performing, and hence negatived criminal intent.
Judge Leventhal rejected this concept of "voluntariness" as too all-embracng. 182'
However, his emphasis on objective, cognitive standards of criminal responsi-
bility, runs counter to recent decisional law' 83 and scholarly comment' 8" em-
phasizing the volitional aspects of criminal behavior.' 8 5 Judge Leventhal's line
of reasoning forecloses by implication, but does not directly answer, appellant's
contention that a consensus now exists that the disease of addiction, like that
of insanity, is characterized by the loss of self-control, and that the court should
recognize that consensus by allowing a defense to criminal responsibility for the
non-trafficking drug addict.' 80
In his petition for certiorari, appellant called for the development of "a federal
common law of crimes that incorporates a concept of voluntariness into all serl-
180. Judge Leventhal indicated in his concurring opinion in Moore that Congress had
occupied the field with its narcotics legislation. Viewing Congress' programs as per-
missible policy choices, he stated: "It is not our province to assess the value of a system
of probation reinforced by jail sanctions." Moore Slip Opinion 101 (Leventhal & McGowan,
JJ., concurring); see, e.g., Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 800-01 (1952); Dubin 346; Hart
429-32; Cruel and Unusual Punishment, supra note 4, at 635.
181. Hart 431-32.
182. Moore Slip Opinion 88 (Leventhal & McGowan, JJ., concurring).
183. See, e.g., United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (insanity);
Salzman v. United States, 405 F.2d 358 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (alcoholism); Easter v. District of
Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (alcoholism); Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761
(4th Cir. 1966) (alcoholism); United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966)
(drug addiction in the context of the insanity defense); United States v. Malafronte, 357
F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1966) (narcotics addiction, alcoholism, insanity); Carter v. United
States, 252 F.2d 608 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (insanity).
184. See, e.g., Dubin 344-45, 365; Hart 410-12; Capacity Defense, supra note 4, at 139,
148-51; Packer, supra note 9, at 147-52. But see J. Hall, General Principles of Criminal
Law 72-73 (2d ed. 1960) for the dangers of such a focus.
185. The fact that ten circuits have now adopted the ALI insanity test after which tle
drug dependence defense is patterned, is indicative of this trend. United States v. Brawner,
471 F.2d 969, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The new test has the effect of broadening the familiar
M'Naughten inquiry of whether the defendant knew the difference between right and wrong,
with its emphasis on cognition, to include the volitional inquiry of whether, given the fact
that the defendant did know the difference between right and wrong, he had the capacity
to act on that understanding.
186. This argument is elaborated on, and made the focal point of, appellant's appeal in
Appellant's Petition, supra note 159, at 12-20.
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ous and stigmatizing offenses."'18 7 This concept would place mens rea back at the
heart of our criminal justice system, making it a positive requirement of culp-
ability rather than an excusing condition.188 As one commentator has pointed
out, "[t]he combination of stigma and loss of liberty involved in a conditional
or absolute sentence of imprisonment sets that sanction apart from anything
else the law imposes. . . .No one should be sentenced to imprisonment or its
equivalent without being afforded the opportunity to litigate the issue of mens
Yea or .. .culpability.' lsa
Secondly, United States v. Moore points toward two ways in which the re-
quirement of mens rea can be constitutionalized. While it has long been stated
that the Constitution does not expressly recognize any principles of criminal
responsibility,190 and certainly no section specifically provides for the lack of
capacity defenses,19' the Supreme Court's decision in Robinson seems to indi-
cate a willingness on the part of the Court to find a constitutional basis for
such principles. Robinson seems to be based not on the excessiveness of the
punishment imposed, nor on the method of punishment used, but on the
broader considerations of decency implicit in the eighth amendment. The tone
of the decision is permeated with the essential unfairness of punishing someone
for being sick.'92 To many commentators who believe that the eighth amend-
ment was an unfortunate constitutional basis for the Court's first excursion into
the area of the substantive criminal law because the eighth amendment requires
only "minimal standards of decency," the "fairness" doctrine has definite over-
tones of substantive due process 93
Due process in fact seems to provide a better, more reliable basis for im-
porting the mens rea requirement into the Constitution than the eighth amend-
ment.' 94 The notion of fairness implicit in due process is a more familiar judi-
cial standard than cruel and unusual punishment,9 5 and due process has already
been applied in situations where, in essence, the defendant cannot conform his
conduct to the requirements of the law. 90 But whatever the basis for its deci-
sion, it would seem that the Court cannot long continue avoiding its confronta-
tion with the underlying principles of responsibility in our criminal justice
system.
187. Id. at 19.
188. Packer 107. A clear holding on this point by the Court would go far towards
expanding the impact of Morissette.
189. Id. at 150-51 (footnote omitted).
190. Dubin 367.
191. Capacity Defense 127. But see Dubin 384 (pointing out that "[tihe evil against
which the ex post facto proscription is directed is identical to that which the capacity
doctrine is designed to avert. Both shield persons in involuntary conditions from the
reach of the criminal sanction.").
192. Frankel, supra note 4, at 590; Greenawalt 935.
193. E.g., Dubin 367; Frankel 589; Greenawalt 934; Capacity Defense 158-65; Cruel and
Unusual Punishment 649; see Hart 431; Packer 151.
194. Greenawalt 972; Cruel and Unusual Punishment 649; Capacity Defense 158, 161.
195. Capacity Defense 161.
196. Id. at 161-62; see text accompanying notes 24 & 25 supra.
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VII. CONCLUSION
United States v. Moore provided the Court with an opportunity to resolve
important and controversial issues of criminal responsibility by resort either to
the Constitution or to the common law. For the reasons that follow, it is the
conclusion of this Comment that the Court soon should break with its tradition
of abstention in this area and take up its share of the burden of defining the
underlying principles of responsibility in our criminal justice system.
In many ways the level of civilization that a society has attained can be
measured by the success it has had in creating a body of criminal law which
can both "preserve legality" and "dispense justice."'0 7 Just as preserving legal-
ity is the undoubted province of the legislature which is the custodian of the
public trust, the dispensation of justice rests with the courts. Preserving legality
focuses on the objective interest of society in maintaining order. The dispensa-
tion of justice focuses on the individual defendant before the court and ex-
amines all of the circumstances relevant to his guilt. Legal standards of criminal
responsibility provide the basis for the individualization of the criminal justice
system.0 8 A delicate balance between the interests of society and the interests
of the individuals who comprise that society has been arrived at in this country
through the institutionalization in two distinct branches of government for
these sometimes conflicting interests. Should either body fail to articulate the
interests it has come to protect, that balance might be destroyed.
To say that the Court should speak out on standards of criminal responsibility
is not necessarily to say that it should recognize the drug dependence defense
as currently proposed. In Leland v. Oregon,199 the Court was asked to hold
that the due process clause required uniform adoption of the "irresistible im-
pulse" test as the standard of responsibility in insanity cases. In rejecting this
contention, the Court stated:
[T]he progress of science has not reached a point where its learning would compel
us to require the states to eliminate the right and wrong test from their criminal
law. Moreover, choice of a test of legal sanity involves not only scientific knowledge
but questions of basic policy as to the extent to which that knowledge should de-
termine criminal responsibility . . . . [Since the] whole problem has evoked wide
disagreement among those who have studied it . . . adoption of the irresistible im-
pulse test is not "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."200
If one views the proper role of the Court in the whole process of developing
principles of criminal liability (as the appellant in United States v. Moore ap-
parently views it) as one of declaring when a consensus exists in society that
the prohibited act is tainted with "involuntariness" and hence not criminally
punishable,20 1 the only possible criticism that can be leveled at the Court's
decision in Leland is that it badly misjudged the state of medical knowledge, if
197. J. Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law 97-98 (2d ed. 1960).
198. R. Pound, Criminal Justice in America 3 (1930).
199. 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
200. Id. at 801 (footnotes omitted), quoted in Capacity Defense 135.
201. Appellant's Petition, supra note 159, at 12-20.
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not the tenor of the times. But relegating the role of the Court to one of carv-
ing out a defense to liability when it realizes a consensus that one should exist
essentially confuses the Court's role with that of the legislature. It is the legis-
lature that should be concerned with reflecting the social consensus in the
criminal laws it enacts. The Court should play a more elevated role; it should
insist that all the relevant facts surrounding the individual's guilt or innocence
be presented at trial and that those facts be measured in all cases against as-
certainable standards of guilt.
Weaving one's way through all of the opinions in United States v. Moore,
and through the literature dealing with the drug dependence defense, one gets
the distinct impression that a consensus exists that punishment can be imposed
in a civilized society only when a man has, as Professor Hart has phrased it,
"the capacity and a fair opportunity or chance to adjust his behavior to [the
requirements of] the law . *... ,202 Free will, the Court reminds us in Moris-
sette, is far from a transient notion in our law.2 0 3 The problem, it would appear,
is not with our legal philosophy, but with accommodating that philosophy in
our laws and translating it into rules of action for everyday use in the court-
room. 
2
An important step in this direction would be the recognition in our drug laws
that different levels of drug use exist,2 0 5 and the articulation of the different
policy goals which presumably should underlie the system of sanctions we pro-
pose for each.208 Only by a total restructuring of our thinking in this area will
we arrive at results which are consistent both with society's interest in the gen-
eral security and the individual's interest in self-expression in its broadest sense.
A few guidelines should be kept in mind.
First, no matter how difficult a task it may be to distinguish between them,
202. H.LA. Hart, Punishment and the Elimination of Responsibility 27-28 (L.T.
Hobhouse Memorial Trust Lecture No. 31, 1962), as quoted in Dubin 344.
203. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952); see text accompanying note
68 supra.
204. Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
205. The National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse suggested there are
actually five levels of drug use: 1. Experimental drug use; 2. Social or recreational drug
use; 3. Circumstantial or situational drug use; 4. Intensified drug use; and 5. Compulsive
drug use. It is class number five for which the drug dependence defense is urged. Second
Report 94-98. Perito, Pinco & Duerk point out: "By failing to recognize a distinction
among categories of possessors of controlled substances-namely, addicts, users, and casual
experimenters, both federal and state laws preclude clear direction for either the courts,
prosecutors, or defense counsel." Perito, Pinco & Duerk, supra note 7, at 195.
206. The National Commission concluded that possession for personal use of any
controlled substance except marihuana should remain a prohibited act. Second Report
273, but that the proper role of the criminal justice system in handling narcotics is
to serve as a detection mechanism so that those who are addicted can be sphoned off
into the therapeutic rather than the criminal process. Id. at 265-67. Conclusions similar
to the ones expressed by this author are reached by Neibel in his article on the implica-
tions of Robinson v. California, supra note 4, at 7, 11, and by Law & Social Change, supra
note 4, at 157-58.
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addicts and non-addict drug users must be handled differently under our laws.
Upon hearing all of the evidence,207 the jury should decide whether the drug
user has lost the ability of self-control with respect to his addiction203 and, thus,
whether he should be allowed to invoke the drug dependence defense.
Second, a distinction should be made in the law between consumption-related
drug offenses such as possession, purchase and use, and other drug-related crimes
involving injury to persons or property.
Third, once the jury has determined that the drug user is an addict, he should
have a complete defense to consumption-related offenses, but should be chan-
neled into a civil commitment program. Commitment should be for a definite,
relatively short period, 20 9 and supervised after-care in the community should be
provided.
Fourth, the addict should also be allowed a partial defense for other drug-
related crimes.2 10 Just as intoxication is now allowed as a defense in most juris-
dictions where it is found to negative specific intent,21' drug addiction should
be considered a mitigating circumstance in crimes requiring specific intent where
the addict has lost the ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of the
law. 212
Fifth, consumption-related offenses of the non-addict drug user should be
treated as violations, and voluntary civil commitment programs should be made
available.
Sixth, non-addicted drug users should be held fully accountable for other
drug-related crimes.
The most important criticisms of these proposals can be anticipated. For
those who fear that thousands of drug addicts will be let free to roam the streets,
one may point to involuntary civil commitment. For those who suggest that
207. A point is made of hearing all of the evidence because of the length of time It
took for the M'Naughten test to be revised to allow testimony on "Irresistible impulse" to
be introduced. See Capacity Defense 135.
208. Perkins suggests that "the notion of a 'voluntary act' as requisite to criminal
guilt may result in the jury's being confused by argument of counsel to the effect that
defendant's act was committed under the stress and strain of difficult circumstances and
hence was not 'voluntary' ". R. Perkins, Criminal Law 749-50 (2d ed. 1969) (footnote
omitted).
209. One commentator points out that mental disease is a dangerous analogy for drug
addiction because short periods of detention with long periods of out-patient care have
proven a better way to deal with narcotics addicts than the long, sometimes life-time com-
mitment of the insane. Capacity Defense 147-48.
210. Chief Judge Bazelon, in concurring with Judge Wright's dissent in Moore, actually
proposed a complete defense for the drug addict for all crimes. Moore Slip Opinion 252-53
(Bazelon, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
211. S. Kadish and M. Paulsen, Criminal Law and Its Processes 50 (2d cd. 1969). The
few courts that have reached the issue have followed the alcohol model of negativing
specific intent in drug cases. State v. White, 27 N.J. 158, 165, 142 A.2d 65, 68 (1958);
cases cited in 21 Am. Jur. 2d Crim. Law § 109, at 188 (1965).
212. For the proposition that the distinction between alcohol and other "psychoactive
substances" contravenes equal protection see Second Report 249.
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these proposals are harsher on the non-addict user than on the addict himself,
one can answer only that the statement begs the question. By the very definitions
set up, the addict lacks the free will which is a prerequisitR to commission of an
act for which he may incur the imposition of punishment, while the non-addict
drug user can still choose between performance or non-performance of the offend-
ing act. In a mature society, punishment must be designed to fit the criminal2 1 3
and civil commitment is the only sensible way to deal with the addict. He is
simply beyond deterrence. While deterrence may also be ineffective against the
highly expressive behavior of the non-addict drug user,2 14 treating his commis-
sion of consumption-related offenses as a violation is designed to use the law as
a symbol for society's disapproval of dangerous drug abuse.2 5 It is unlikely that
society has yet reached the stage where it is willing to abolish all penalties for
drug use,216 and the Court might seriously undermine its legitimacy by requir-
ing such abolition.
The most serious objection raised will undoubtedly be that lines cannot be
drawn simply between the addict and the non-addict drug user. But the jury
is called upon to determine when a man lacks responsibility because of mental
disease or defect, and, in at least two circuits, 217 must determine when a person
has lost his power of self-control with respect to alcoholic beverages. It is diffi-
cult to comprehend why a similar determination with respect to the addict could
not be made.
That the Court should allow such a determination rests on the need for unify-
ing principles of responsibility in our criminal justice system. It simply does not
make good sense for the courts to abdicate their share of responsibility in this
area to the legislatures and to allow imposition of the criminal sanction to be
totally the legislative embodiment of society's attitude toward specific types of
"deviant" behavior at any given moment.
In 1869, Judge Doe of the New Hampshire Supreme Court observed that:
When disease is the propelling, uncontrollable power, the man is as innocent as the
weapon,-the mental and moral elements are as guiltless as the material. If his mental,
213. See Hearings on S. Res. 48, S. 1895, S. 2590, S. 2637 Before the Senate Comm. on
the judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 670 (1969); Final Report of the President's Advisory
Comm'n on Narcotic and Drug Abuse 3 (1963); Hart 427.
214. Second Report 251; Charnbliss, Types of Deviance and the Effectiveness of Legal
Sanctions, 1967 Wis. L. Rev. 703, 713. Chambliss found in several studies that drug
addiction is essentially an expressive act and that drug addicts are committed to a life of
crime. These two factors taken together cause addicts to be relatively unaffected by the
threat or the imposition of punishment. Id. at 712.
215. Second Report 255. "Unfortunately, 60 years of coercive policy have so exag-
gerated the symbolic importance of the criminal law that it has bpcome interwoven with
social attitudes regarding drug use. Removing it suddenly would connote a change in values
rather than merely a shift in emphasis." Id. at 255-56.
216. More radical plans for dealing with drug abuse, such as making the addictive
substance available at a low cost to everyone, seem to run into the same stumbling block.
See Capacity Defense 157.
217. Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Driver v. Hinnant,
356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966).
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moral, and bodily strength is subjugated and pressed to an involuntary service, it is
immaterial whether it is done by his disease, or by another man, or a brute or any
physical force of art or nature set in operation without any fault on his part. If a
man knowing the difference between right and wrong, but deprived, by either of
those agencies, of the power to choose between them, is punished, he is punished for
his inability to make the choice-he is punished for incapacity; and that is the very
thing for which the law says he shall not be punished.2 18
One hundred and four years and countless judicial decisions have gone by
since State v. Pike but we are still very far removed from the ideals ex-
pressed in that revolutionary opinion.
Irene A. Sullivan
218. State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399, 441-42 (1869) (Doe, J.), overruled on other grounds,
Hardy v. Merrill, 56 N.H. 227, 235 (1875).
